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PllEFACB 
Charles Sand.~a ,etree,1 considered by many aa tne 
leading philosophical genius ot ADlerioa. 1. one of the most 
thought-provoking figures 1n American ph1losophy_ Antedating 
James and Devey (1839-1914), hi. name 1. eclip.ed by ~elr 
b~lght 11ghts because of his failure to publ1sh a oomplete 
wo~k, or even a slngle book, setting forth hi. ph1losophical 
opinions. '!'he crabbed manner of h1s a tyle, hi. tnabl11 t1 to 
caM7 erandl0 •• projects through to completlon, the tuclnatlon 
ot new logical problem. and ontological oategori.s .. the •• are 
among the faetor.'which .ake 'elrco'8 an endle •• 1,. a tlmul at lng , 
leminal mind, and ,.et one that disapPOints and barn •• at the 
very moment When It s.ems about to re •• al. 1 tseU. Unable to 
eltab11ah h~.elt 1n a teaching posltlon tor more than a ,.e .. 
or two, he .pent the greater part of hl. lite working tor the 
United states coast survey, dOing lome ot the moat brilliant 
1 The fam1ly name vas spelled "Pora" when the or1g-
inal anoestor emigrated, and in many quarters 1t haa oont1nued 
to bo pronounoed that vay_ 
iv 
v 
,oientifie work ot hi. day, for whiCh he i8 .till remembered. 2 
His primary interest, though, lay 1n the fields ot logic and 
philosophy_ His father, Benjamin Peirce, the foremost Aaerlcan 
mathematioian ot his time and an inspiring teacher at Harvard, 
trained Chulesso thorougbl,. that ha could latel' a.y. "He 
eduoated .e, and it I do anythIng it will be hi. work." Through 
the tborough training by hi. father, •• peeiall,. in .a~atlc., 
Charle. "a. able to make .ignlficant progre •• 1n the tie1.4 ot 
10glo, particularly 1n math&.mat1cal 10g1c, .nare his work .Iuper-
•• ded that of 8001e in the .at1matioD ot sehrVder, .no based 
muoh of h1. Vorla.!9ie~ ~ 41. Algebra d!r LOllk on Peirce" 
1mpro"elllenh ot Bo01.e t. '7stem. 
PeIrce'. reading 1n philosophy, al.o begun under tbe 
direction ot his tather with who. h. "de.oted two hours a day . 
to the atudlot !Cant' a Cr1tlc of Pure I'<.eaaon for more than 
................ J 
three ,.eara," until he "alma.' knew the whole book bJ h.art,·3 
was supplemented by a study of LOCke, Berkeley, and Hume, 
2 Paul wel.s, in the article on Charles Sanders 
Peiroe 1n the Dlctlonat[ of American !lographl, New York, 1943, 
XIV, 398-403, sIves £5. be.t aSori acoount or Peiro.'s llte. 
This awumary i. indebted to h1m tor man,. ot 1 ta taota. 
J CoUected papera ot Charles Sanders Peirce, edited 
by Oharl.s Hart.Eorn. an~ .'aul-W.I.a, Harvard, I9'1.I~jS, 1.560. 
The volume. are entitled a. tOllOW.8. I, prtncfile. ot Philoao-
~I II, Ele.ent. ot LOtiO' III, 1.iXact Liste, , tne-sm;.a! 
!!ithematicaJ V, 'r'ii!!!-•• and praAiie _.' VI, sitin'E 0 
Meta~h~.lo.. ThI. WGri, iblin wI~. referred to .8 ap, I. 
11.! e Inlo nuabered parai.apha. Henoe all reterenc.;-vill be 
by vo1Ul1le and »vuraDh. I:~60allm1ty1n1l Vol. I. Para. 1;'60. 
... 
ollowed "'1 the acholaatics st. Augustine, Abelard, John or 
allsburr, st. 1homas Aquinas, nun. Scotul, and Wil11am OelrhaDl. 
eid, Hamilton, John Stuart Mill, Hegel, and Schelling al80 
ame under hi. purview, 80 It ean be •• 1d that hi. acque.1n-
tance with the history ot philoaophy was sufficiently exten-
aive to have enabled him to evaluate Tarious po.ltions and 
scbools with a somewhat critical e,.8. One ot the tirst fruita 
ot hi. study and reading ... a paper entitled "Hov to Make our 
Idea. Clear," published in the PSlular Sci.n~~ Monthlz in 1678, 
which contain.d the first formulation, though not the name, ot 
pragmat1s.. It was not . until 1698 that William Jamea popular .... 
ized the n .... ot pragmat1., but in 80 doing he aodltl.d it to 
such an extent that 'eirce haatil,. rechristened hi. own doctrine 
pragmatic is., a term which, he wrote, vas lIfug1,. enough to b • 
• at. tromkidnapp.r. •• •4 
One factor that p"vented Peirce tl"Oll$ ex.roi.ing more 
influence vaa hi. lack of a •• oclation witB other intellectual 
leader8 of the time. In hla earlle~ da78 he had a.aoelated 
vi th Nioholas st. John Green, Ohaunoe., Wright, Francis Elling-
wood Abbot, and Will181'1'l J .. e.. But J.1e8 1s the only one of 
his younger contemporarles with whom Peiroe ever became Inttmat.,? 
. S 'l'be personal "1a tiona betv.en the two men, as .ell 
&8 the philosophical influenoe ot Peirce un J .... , has been abl,. 
h Barton ,. in The Thou t d Character or 
-
y11 
~d even her~ Peirce had the trustration of seeing James, despite 
18 10ye tor truth, holding the exact opposite of himaelf on 
~any tund.ental lssue.. Pelrce lav hls own tolble8 ot character 
~n contralt to Jam.lt "Who, tor example, could be of a nature 
o ditterent tr~ hi. a8 I' ae 80 concrete, 80 livingJ I a mere 
~able ot $ontents, so abstract, ,a very anarl of tvine."6 
ae retired rather early In lite to "the wllde.t county 
Ion the Northern state.," and bullt himself a large farmhouse 
~.ar Milford, pennaylvania. Here, except fOr occasional leetur.~ 
~. spent the re.t of hi. 11te, devoting himself to his writing 
on logic and philosophy. He trled to make a 11 ttle mone,. by 
~iting all tne definitions on 10glc, metaphysicl, mathematlcs, 
mechanlca, aatronom" aatrology, welghts, measures, and univer-
.1tles tor several large dictionaries, along with book reviews 
on a wide range ot toplcs tor the Nat10n. All 1n all, he turned 
, llitb 
out about 2,000 vords a day, with care and 1n a clear hand. But 
he failed to get a publllher tor the aeveral books he planned, 
and in his diH poverQ- it vas William James who came to his aid 
in hi. declining years. B.J 1909 Peirce vas a very ill man ot 
seventy, compelled to take. grain ot morphine daily to stave 
ott pain. 1hrough hi. la.t tive year., although his original 
-
~il1iam lam •• , eoatont 193>, .sp. It chap. xxxii; II, lxxv, lxxvi. 
6 CP, 6.184.5 •• 6.182-184 tor a beautitul portrayal 
ot Peiree'a .ii ••• tor Jam ••• 
I""'" 
viil 
<II ~ork was over, he continued with undiminiShed perslatency to 
~aerk many ot his tormer .ssaya .. tormlng the letters with gre.t 
diffIculty to judge trom the tremulous, painstakIng script. 
In 1914 he d1ed ot oancer, a trustrated, iaolated man, stIll 
working on his logic, wi thout a publisher, wi th scarcely' a 
disciple, unknown to the public. at large. 
Yet this is the man ot whoa. lactim"s Jamas wrote: 
They are as "tlashe. ot brilliant light r.lieved agaiut Cim-
merian blaCkne8s."7 Indeed, as more become acquainted with hle 
ldeaa through the CoUected PaRer., the,. aubserlbe to the worda 
of Morris Cohen: "It philosophio eminence were measured not by 
the number ot finished treatises ot dignitied length, but by the 
extent to which a man bJtought foJttb new and truittul ideas ot 
radical importance, O.S. Pelrce would e.al1,. be the greatest 
figure in American philosophy_n8 
7 ':r~atII1Dl' a New Name tor Some Old !!!Z! or 
Thinking, New YOI' , XI)07,-S-;- - - - - -
8 Quoted bJ Thomas A. Goudge, l!!!. ThO¥et !! .£:. L 
Peirce, Toronto, 1950, facing p. 1. 
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CRAPTER I 
INTRODUO'fIOtf 
Little exaggeration ls n •• ded to sa7 that no prOblem 
baa caused !lore turol'. in the ph1losoph1cal world than that 
tirat rala.d by Bo.thlua- Latln verslon ot porphyry'. Intro-
duction!2!2! categorl •• !! ~rl.totle 1n the tifth c.n~1 
I sball retu.. to ea7 conoerning genera and ap •• i8. 
whether the7 subslat or whether they are placed in 
the naked understanding. alone or Whether 8ubal.ting 
the,. are corporeal or inco!'poreal, and wh. the!' they 
are •• parated trom •• n.lble. or placed in •• n.ibl •• 
and in accord v1 th them. Que.tlons ot th1. 80rt are 
most exalted busl! ••• and require verr great 4ili-
genoe ot inqulry. 
The implications ari81ng from the V&l!'iOU8 solutions to this 
pregnant que.tion have colored the historr of philo.oph,. through 
the age., and. it i. largel,. On • phl108opher'. IntwpretatloD 
ot this problem ot un1versals, or on his .tfmd in the controver8,. 
between nomina118m and realism, that his philosoph,. will be 
based. It he bolds that genera and speCies rea117 exlst, he 1 • 
• realist, It he holds, on the other hand, that tney are mere 
pames by whlch slmilar ind1viduals are deSignated, he 1s a nomi-
1 Rlchard MCKeon, ed. and trana., Selee tlona from 
Medleval J?11108oPllers, New York, (1929], I, 91. -
1 
., 
2 
nal18t. Ano"'ther way of contrasting the two doctrines 1. this. 
Realism 1. the doctrlne that genera and .pecle. are not mere 
eonoeptlon. or the mind, but real things actually existing out-
side the mindJ nominalis. is the opposing doctrine that indi-
vidual, particular objects alone are real.' The hlstoPJ ot 
philosophy haa been the hlatoPJ. or the ascendancy of one or 
other ot the.e ide.s. 
Setore any further progre •• i. made, a caretul di.-
tinction must, be noted, tor there are realism. and realisma. 
Realis. 1. a term bridging two widely-varying tields, and it 
is well to be ava!"e of this ditterenoe. ,Relli_ i. t"irst taken 
as a doctrine oppoaed to idealia., namely, as stating that there 
are thlngs whlch exist outside tbe mind. secondl,., reall •• i. 
-
a doctrine oppoaed to noaina11am, and it holds that the tbings 
really existlng out.1de the m1nd are not .er8 .ingular., but 
have aome 80rt of cOll1lNnl ty. It i8 plain that the Acond t7J)e 
ot" realiam 1. dependent upon the t"irst, tor it the:re were no 
real thlngs glven, then obYiou.l~ there would be no gen.palit~ 
or CODDlUnit,' among them. Thla the.i. i. primarily concerned 
with real.lam in the aecond .ense a. opposed to nomlna11am, and 
the other type vill be tOUGhed on onl,. •• neoe.s817 to prove 
2 iti.nne Gilson, The un1tl ot Phl10S0!hlCal Experi-
ence, Je. York, 1947, 12. setiilao Fre1irlci eop esEon, 3:3., 
IJ:stO!7 .!! Philoaophz, westminster, Maryland, 19$0, II, 140 .. 
-3 
.., 
that peirce was working W1 th real things. 
In the ancient Greek world philosophy was predomi-
nant17 realistic, and this dootrine continued to hold 8va7 
thrOughout the Middle Age.. S1nee then, however, and •• pecially 
since the Renalssance, h"'Ul'Opean phlloaoph10l1 the whole h •• been 
nominalisti.. st. ThoDla. Aquinas had definitive17 and oonclu-
sivel,. •• ttled the controvers,. in tavor of real1.-. In the 
rourteenth centu1'1. hOV"er, there was a great outburst ot nomi-
naliSM under the leadersnip ot \V-illiam ockham. Oakham'" dootrine 
arose t1'Oll an appo.1 tion to Scotu8, tor be stated that the indi-
vidual contained nothing which v.a similar or common with aIV 
ether individual. The universal. did not ex1st 1n an,. wa,. in the 
real world.' Nominalism, however, despite the tact that 1t was 
allied in the controvers~ between Church and state with tn. 
party opposing the .xc •• aive powers ot the pope and extolling 
clvl1 government, a conn.etion which lent the philoaophical doc-
trine a factitious tollo_ing, never was able to take over the 
field In the fourteenth ~enturJ. One ot the main obstacle. to 
the earl,. apread of nominalism. waa the k.en scot1s tic thinkers, 
all realists, who were 11). the predoa1nan; poei tiona or authorIty 
in the uni.ersitIe.. A oentury later, hovever,when scoti •• had 
n F. 
died out wltn the death ot the leading Scotl.ta, the humanist. 
took over thelr chalrs In the universities. 
Peirce has Shown how the vlctor1 ot the humanists 
brought vitn it the nomin&118t1c phl1osophYI 
'lbe humanists were weak thinkers. Some ot the. 
no doubt might haYe been trained to be strong th1nker8J 
but thq had no .evere trtUning in thought. All their 
energies went to writing a olas.lcal language and an 
artistic style ot .xpreuion. They went to the ancienta 
tor their philosophy. and mostly took up the three 
e.atest ot the ancient aects of philosoph,., Epicure. 
anism, stoiclsm, and Scepticl ••• ~ 
As the.e three philosophies were all ba.ically nOttdnali.tlc, 
there waa " .. tIdal wave ot nominalism. Descartea was a nom1-
nalist. Locke and all hi. tollowing, Serkeley, Hartley, Hume, 
and even Reid were n01l1n&11.t.. te1bnl. was an extreme nomi-
nalist."S Theretore the history ot the last tour cent~lea 
1a the story of the complete vlctorr ot nomina11sm. aeglnning 
as an attack on the Church, 1t was taken over by technical 
ph110sophy. and tro.. phllosophy it apread until it had deployed 
1tself on &11 the I,ront1er. ot mants dally exlstenoe. solence, 
of cour .. , vt. the fleld in whlch nomlnal11D1 found Its moat 
enthuslastio r.~eptlon. WIth the penchan. for exper1mentatlon 
whioh aro •• wi th Pr .... 1a Bacon, Kepler, GalUeo, and Copernicus 
Culminating 1n tne nominalistic COSMology of Newton, modern acl. 
4 ll, 1.1S. 
S CP. 1.19. 
-
.. 
• noe beca_ ..... or thought 1 thad be.olle-irrevocably aSloelated 
wIth nominal18m. 6 'lhat this 1. not true wl11 be shown when the 
positlon or Francis Ellingwood Abbot i. dlscu •• ed. 
Nominalism, then, va. ...,eeping the f1eld and carrylng 
all betore it in philosophY' and selenee. The new thinkers weN 
incapable ot the .ubtle thought. that would have been neceasarr 
tor any adequate di.cu •• lon ot the tuestlon ot univeraala. The,. 
acc.pted nOminalistic vlews on the mo.t .uperlIc!.l grounds. 
The age.old que.tion ot Boeth1us aoon became buried and put out 
ot l'llght by nev que.tiona that overlaid 1 t, 11ke new papers on 
an encumbex-ed 8tudy d •• k. 'eople no' longe:r asked, What i8 the 
real? Is it the aingular or unIversal' The indivldual 01" the 
.pecl •• ' This whole problem gave -*7 to the cr1t1cal question 
whtch the medieval. would never hay. bothered ask1ng beeaua. he 
took it tor granted, How 1. knowledge po •• ible at all,7 
This waa the atate ot artat~s at the time ot Kant, 
who vas the 10glcal outgrowth or nominaliam. How thIs develop-
ment took place can be polnted out brIet1,.. ' The essence ot 
nominal! •• is the doot~1n. that univer.als corre.pond to nothIng 
really exlstent outslde the mInd" but are eIther mere emptJ 
6 Se. J .... Felbleman, ~e Revival ot Reallsm, 
Chapel Hill, North Cvollna, 1946,-n-X&. - , 
7 ThIs point va. made by C.R.S. Harris In Duns scotus" 
VoL III ~. Philos22h1cal Doctrines ot Dun. Scotu., ditora a£ 
the clarenlon :Preel, 1ft1. 1&. --
6 
names 01" n .... denoting subjective concepts. 8 I'ominall_ tbua 
distinctly anticipated the Kantian critical philosophy in re-
terring the _oure. ot all seneral conceptions (and thereby ot 
all human knowledge), not to the object alone, or to the object 
and 8ubject together, but to the subject alODe, it distinctly 
anticipated the doctrine that ~thing. conform to cognition, not 
cognition to th1nga. n9 Since universals are classiticatioDa or 
things based on their suppo.ed r •••• blanc.. and ditterence., 
the denial ot all objective reality to universal. i. the denial 
ot all obJeotive reality to the suppo.ed re.aablanc •• and dit-
ter.nce. ot things th ••• elvesJ.the denial ot all knowl.dge of 
the relations of objects is the denlal.ot all knowledge ot the 
objects related, and thi. denial is tantamount to the assertion 
that things-in-the.s.lve. are utterly unknown. Thus Oakham wa. 
merely a nominalistic predece •• or ot Kant, who, 1n h1. turn, 
pushed the lack of corr •• pondence betw.en the logiC ot concept. 
and the tacta ot the external world to a oonstItut1onal InabI11ty 
to brIdge the gap.10 Kant .1noe ha. swung all sub.equent specu-
latIon into nominal1stic channels) and all ot modern phIlo-
8 Albert stVcki, G •• ehichte der Philosophle de. 
Mittelalterl!' MaIns, 186S, II, 962. - · -
9 Thu. argue. Prancia Ellingwood Abbot in ScIentifIc 
Thei .. , 2nd ed., Boston, 1886, 3-4. 
10 Auguste Brunner, S. J .. , ~ Conn.ia.anee Hu:maIne, 
Pa!"1a, Q.9411, 268. 
7 
... 
• ophy, insofar as it 1. based on Kantlanism, may be said to 
rest, by tacit agreement, upon the nominalistic theo17 of uni-
versals. 
Kant therefore not only espou.ed nominalism, but even 
went turther and set up an idealistie philosoph,._ Although a 
reaction waa felt againat Kant And hi. immediate IUOCe •• or. al-
most at onc., it took some t~e tor philosopher. to work out tne 
ideas in logioal torm. To repair the damage done by Kan t, ideal-
la. had first of all to be refuted and the .xi.ten •• ot real 
things outslde the mind again established. Thomas Reld was the 
leader of this movement, and although not of the philosophio 
.tature of the Sage ot }thig_bers, he produoed an etteot on 
philosophy wnich haa eventuall,. been ot extreme importanc •• 
Reid re.tored the reality of the mind, against Hume, and ot that 
which the mlnd knows, the .xternal world, including both sub-
.tanee and all posslbilities, agaln.t Kant. Thus, although. Reid 
dld not go all the way and evolve a theory of universal., he did 
open the wa,. toward re.lism again br vindicating the .xi.tenc. 
ot real Object., and thereby made a theory ot uniy.~sal. pos. 
sible again. Hia influence during the nineteenth oenturoy waa 
not great, although it was then that he lett hi. impress on the 
moat important of American realist., Charles sandera ,eirce. ll 
11 James F.ible~, An Introduction to Pelrce'. 
!hl1oao2hl, New York, (). 946.J. 4~. ' -
8 
... 
A' i. evident, more will be .een ot Peirce" oontrlbution to 
the oause ot real1sm 1n the following page •• 
Fundamentally, though, the reaction to nominalIsm 
ha. a much more radical cause than the oppos1tIon of a school 
ot realist philosophers. The reason Why real1am.ls assuming 
a widenIng .phere ot importance. i. that oontemporary scientists 
and philo.ophers are diseov.ring that the pr.supposition for 
which th-.y had thought nominalism was • ne •••• ary condition 18 
tals.. What is th1s pnsuppos1tlon' It i8 that empiriCal. 
acience is •••• nti.lly na.inali.tio and requires a metaphysios 
and .pistemology balled on nomina11_ tor its foundation .tonea .. 
scientist. the.selves haVe ahown,.how.ver, that emplrical. ael-
ence i, not based on nominalism,l! lnd •• d, d • .,lte ~at .clen-
tists may protess a. their philosophy, they are es.entialll 
realists When thel turn to their sciences. This i8 the burden 
and theme ot the Introduction to Abbot'. Soientitic Thei •• , 
I 
a book tor whioh Peirce oan Deyer tind .uttlclent prai.e. 
Abbot tirst argues that modern philosophy hal been overshadowed 
by the blight ot nominalta. l ) Following this there 18 an ac-
oount of the hi.torr ot the variou.s type. ot realism, ranging 
t2 william stanley Jevona, !he prinOll18. ot Solence, 
a Treatl.8 on Loale and Sclentific MetliiW, 'Ii'id e., London, . 
Y881, 8-9. A180 Johil'!iii(!.lI, 'fill:;.!!l! Elect:r1cltl. New york, 0.1872, 60.61. 
13 Abbot, Scientific 'lheiem, 1-14. 
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t~o. Plato f • ext~.me re.11s. to Abbott, own tOeorr of relationiam 
wh1ch he wishes to eatabllah.14 Next AbbOt proves that, While 
phIlosophy became nominaliatic attar the downtall ot scholas-
ticism, .cienoe has been and 1s e .. antially opposed to that 
doC trine. IS Abbot" poai tlon ls neatly ,llnmlari.ed in th$ 
tollowing paa,agel 
Solence 11 to-day challenglng emphatically the 
verr foundation of both a ,riori and a eo.tertari 
philosophies. and the ohil-enge is none t5. te •• 
menaoing Or deep-toned, because it haa bean hitherto 
uttered in d.ed ~ather than in word. She denie'l 
not by a theoP,1 a. yet, but by the erection of a 
va.t and towering editlce of .erifled objectlve 
knowledge, that genera and .peole. are devoid of 
objective reality, or that general terms are desti-
tute ot objective correlates. ahe d'niea that No.i-
nalia haa rlghtly 80l.ed the problem ot univ.paUs, 
when that solution would in an Instant, it conceded, 
swap away all that aha haa won t-rom Nature by the 
aweat of hel' brow. Her ..,el!7 exiatence 11 the abun-
dant vindication ot Relationi __ , aa the Itable and 
8011a roungat10n or real knowledge ot an objeotive 
univ.rae.J. 
Abbot 1n hi. book expounds the nec.ssity ot philosoph7 "oatch1ng 
up" with scienoe. ae want. the queen ot the acience. to tormu-
14 Ibid., 1,5-29. Hia theo17 wiU be presented 1n 
aome detail tn-miipter 1br.e. Very bJ'iefl,., hovever, relation-
1am, or relational realism, is a theory which teaohes that uni-
versals aJ"e, first, objective relationa of resemblance among 
objectivel,. extst1ng th1ngs, se cond 1,. , subjective concepta or 
the •• relat10nl determined 1n the mind b1 the relationa th~ 
aelves, and, thirdly, name. representative both or the rela-
tions and the concepta, and applicable alike to both. 
15 Ibid., 29-S5. 
-
16 Ibid., 36. 
-
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late explicitly the ~eallstic suppositions on which modern em-
pirical soience 1s bas.d: 
Scienee has aChieved all ita marvellous triumphs 
by practically denying the rundamental principle laid 
down by Kant. an~ by practically proceeding upon its 
exact opposite, and it is a scandal to phIlosophy that 
she haa bot yet legittmated this practical procedure, 
overwhelmingly justified as it is by its incontrovert-
ible results. The ti •• hal come tot' philosophy to 
revers. the Roscellino-Kantian revolution, and ~iv. 
to .cience a theory of knowledge which shall render 
th. SCientific method, not practicall,. successtul 
(fot' t~,t it already ia), but theoreticallJ impreg-
bable. 
It is plain that Abbot was one or the ear11 heralds of the modern 
return to realiam.. 
But what doe. all this have to do vi tb Peirce' What 
bearing doe. the .edieval oontrover.J OVer realism and nomi-
nalism have on hi. philosophY' These are questions upon Which 
this thesis will attempt to throw some light. 
A. tor the problem of universals, at least Gne tropor-
tant philosophe~ i8 disinclined to view 1t .s exclusive property 
ot the Middle AS •• , but rather states, "I think PeIrce was 
right in regarding the reallst-nom1nallst oontroversy as one 
which is still undeCided, and which 1s as important now as at 
any tormer time.-1S Peiree himself "declared tor realism," 
and although he had "sinoe very caretullJ and thorougblJ 
18 Bertrand Russ.ll in Foreword of An Introduction 
toP.iree's fhilosophy by J'am4lls Feibleman. u.-· ' 
11 
revised" hli philosophical opinion. "more than helt a dozen 
times, and had m.odified them more or less on lIOst topics" J 
,till he had "never been able to think dI.f'feren tly on that 
que.tion of nOll.1nallll'11 and 1"e&.11 ... "19 As a 1"_8<17 agaInst 
the nominalism ot modern philosophy he ~sested a return to 
.cholastic realIsm, particularl,. that of nuns seotus. 1hU8 he 
writes 1n 1897: 
The work. ot Duns Scotus have atrongly influenced 
.me. It hi. logic and metaphys!ca, not slavishl.,. wor-
ahlppld,.but torn away trom ita medievali., be adapted 
to modern aul writ, under contInual whole.ome reminders 
of nominalistI0 crItiCisms, 1 am convinced that it 
will go tar toward supplyIng the philosotay which is 
beat to ha~n1z. with phJsioal aolenoe. 
Peirce too had his tona ot the problem of univeraal •• 
He "a ••• no objection to defining it as the que.tion ot which 
i. the beat, the laws or the taot. under theae lawa."21 Thi. 
que.tion "18 as pre8sing tod., as eve. it was. R22 That Peirce 
respected Abbot'. crItloism of nominal! .. may be gathered fro. 
these atatements, 
Dr. Fnnoi8 Ellingwood Abbot in the very remanable 
IntltOduction to his book entitled "Scient1t!e Thei8m" Cleesj abowed on the contra17,: "quite o()nclu81ve1y, 
that selenee has alva,.. been at heart realistic, and 
always _at be ltoJ and upon comparing his wrl tinge 
19 OP 
-' 
1.20. 
20 CP, 1.6. 
-
21 ep, 4.1. 
-
22 Ibid. 
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with mrne, It Is 8.8117 aeen that these reatures ot 
nominalia. which I polnted2Qu t in sclence are merel,. supert!clal and transient. ~ 
Agaln peirce says: 
:Dr. (P. E;) Abbot In his Seientific 'l'be1sM [l88s) 
has 80 clearl,. and with such .a.lraS! •• Implic1t,. 
shown that modern acience 11 realistic that It is 
perhaps inJudioious tor me to attempt to add an,.-
thing upon the subject. ret I shall trr to put It 
into auch a lIght that it may reflect aome ral4 upon 
the worth or worthle •• neaR ot detached ideas. 
It i. quite evident that Peirce believed himaelf' to be a 
realist, and Indeed, to have gone back to Sootus tor the basl. 
ot his rea11,tlc theory. In this thesia the reall$m of' Peirce 
will be further inve.tigated to flnd out ~.ther he is really 
a sohol.stic realist, as <11e '0 otten clalmed, or vhether he 
tollows the relation!.m ot Abbot. But betore thl. problem 
ean be solved, anothe,. q~l~st!on mU8;t tirst be taken Upt that 
ot the reall.- or P.1rce, it. relatIon to hIe sources, and hls 
us. ot h1. sources. 
23 CP, 1.20. 
-
24 CP, 4.1. 
-
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CRAPTER II 
PEIROE'S PRO!ESTAT!ONS OF REALISM 
It .. phUoaopher 1s to have a realis tic philosophy 
based on universals, then quite obviously he must rejeot nom!. 
nalism somewhere along the line. Therefore, betor. entering 
into a discussion ot the realism which Peirce found to be con-
sequent upon the acceptance ot the three categories, ~hiCh i. 
a kind ot Aristotelian1s., "ot the scholastio wing, approaching 
scotisnt, but going much turther in the direction ot soholastic 
1 
realis.,· it will be well to consider brietly Peirce f • argu-
ments against nominalism. 
NominalisM, Whlch is tor Peirce the bellet that 
"l!!! and general tzp!8 are flgments of the mind,fl2 hold. that 
particular tacts or events are the only realities. Since the .. 
eventa must be understood, it is usetul to record them by mean. 
ot abstract expressIons. Some ot the latter, $Uch as the laws 
ot motion, summarize the way in which certain events have tol-
lowed one another. Other Itatementa, .uch as "hardness" or 
-
lOP, 5.77n. 
-
2 CP, 1.16. 
-
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-lntelligen6," summarize What haa been found to obtain in 
numerous individual instance.. All these abstractions are mere-
ly convenient device. wh10h have no other purpose apart trom the 
role they play in knowing. They designate noth1ng 1n the natural 
world. 'e1ree, 1t i. evident, include. under the one oategol"7 
ot nominalism both the extreme .nominalists who argue that ab-
.tract terma are nothing but words, and the conceptualists who 
admit that abstract terms are meaningful word. which d.signate, 
however, purely mental conoepta. Conoeptualis. i8 but another 
torm ot nominali8m, and the only re.son that conceptualist, 
have tried to maintain that their posItion 1. independent ot 
nominalism is the1r "loole and slapdash atyle ot thinking *hat 
has made it poasible tor them to remain nominalists.") In 
reality conceptual1 .. 1s noth1ng but a muddle-headed to~ or 
nominaliam. 
FrOm the Tantage point at hi. realism 'eirce kept 
nominalism under oontinuous tlre tor many years. Hia attitude 
toward it verged close to oontempt. "Modern nominalists are 
mostly superficial men. n4 any one of whom reminds 'eirce of 
the blind spot on the retina, "so wonderfully doe. he uncon-
s.ioualy smooth over hi. field ot vislon and omit tacts that 
stare him in the tace, while s.eing all round them wi thout per-
-
3 qp, 1.27. 
4 CP, 5.312. 
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oelving any~gap 1n his vlew ot the world. a5 El •• wbere he .a,., 
that "nominalist. oannot reason about Intinity. because they 
dO not reason logically about anything. a6 Such 18 hi. antlpathy 
to the doct.lne that he even disapprove. ot s~otu. becau.e of 
an Inclination to nominalism, d •• pite his otherwise high e.te •• 
ot the Subtle Doctor. 7 
Felbleman haa divided 'elrce'. arguments agalnat nomi-
nallsm into four cla.aitications, according a8 they are taken 
a) from logic, b) fram metaphysics, c) tram psychology, and d) 
trom science. A. he hims.lf conced •• , however, "the •• are very 
rough dlvisions, tor the arguments enade ott almolt impercept. 
lbly into one another_aS T.heretore, rather than give a~ent. 
trom eaoh ot the.e tonts, a typical tew wl11 be selected to 
,how what Peirce" mind on the que.tion vae, tor, aa Feibleman 
points out 1n another vork, ,elroe "aav the contradiotion whioh 
makea nominall •• untenable, th&t sinoe nominaliam allows no 
universal principl •• 1t cannot allow Itaelt, ainoe It too 1. a 
universal pr1nc1ple. a9 
5' cP, 
-
4.1 .. 
6 cP, 
-
1.165. 
7 CPt 1.560. 
-
8 Introduction ~ 'eirceta Philosophy, 173. 
9 ~ Revival g£ R.ali~, 34. 
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'!'hi tiz-at arg\teent ahows that nominalism makes 
imPossible not only id.ntity but a180 81m11az-1ty: 
NOW, upon the nominalist1c theOl7'i there 1.8 not only 
no absolute or uu.er1cal identlty. but ~ere az-e not 
even an,. r.al a6ft.ementa ot 11kene.aea between indi-
vIduals, tor likeness oonsists me%'817 1n the oalling 
of several individuals by one namf& or (in lome 878-
tems) in theiz- exoiting one Idea. 
~ls nominalistic hypotheais whiCh denie. real agreement or 
likenesa '~ut. ott all reaBoning and commun1cation, it true, 
it would make all human discourse, which is based on identlt1' 
and ditterence, impossible and would prohibit all planning. 
?bat it 1. not true 1. aftlrmed b1 the ex.1stenee or suoce •• rul 
reasoning, communicatIon, dilcourae, and planning. 
Another argument can be taken trom the reality of 
abstz-act:fona, tor "the citadel of nominaliam" will fall eaa,. 
v1ctim to tho.e who "have once l10unted the ventag .... point of 
the logie ot re1at1v.s.,,11 which "ahows that the introduction 
of abstl"actions-whlch the nominalista have taken aueh delight 
in ridiculing--i. of the greatest aerv1ee in nec ••• ary Inter-
eno •• -12 The argument is long, but contains an illustration 
uaed otten by pe1rce and h1s oommentators: 
It i8 very ea.,. to laugh at the old phyalcian 'Who Is 
11 CP, 4.1. 
-
12 CP, 4.611. 
-
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represented as anewering the quest lon, why oplum puts 
people to al •• p, by saylng that It 18 because It haa 
a dormatlve virtue. It ls an anawer that no doubt 
oarr1 •• vagueness to lts 1a8t extreme. Yet, invented 
a8 the storr was to Show how 11ttle meaning there 
mlght be in an abstraction, nevertnelesl the phyalcian t a 
anawer 40es contain a truth that modern ph1losophy haa 
generall,. denled, it do •• aa.ert tnat there really 1. 
in opium somethi5 which explains i t8 always putting 
people to .leep. This hU, I aay, been denied by 
modern phllolophers generally_ 50t, ot cours., ex-
pli01 t17J but when the,. aal that the dltterent events; 
of people going to sleep atter taking opium have 
:really nothing In oommon, but ont7 that the m1nd 
cla •• e8 them together--and thls la What they vi .... 
tually do .a.,. in deny1ng the reallty ot generala-
they do implioltly deny that there 18 any true .x-
Planat!Qnot opium'S generally putting people to 
ale.p. ,J 
This passage ~ows that nominali .. i& tal.e 11'1 denylng that there 
i. any .... n •• s 171111 unCl.tneath a1al1a:r things 01' .vent. 1n the 
world. 
NQ81nall •• oan be retuted troa psyohological ground. 
In this .anner: lIoalnall_ hold. that .",e:ryth1ng 1. known 
.& an 1ndividual. and that theN 1. no reason tor two thing. 
giving the same Idea to the mind (8ince the,. do not tund.ent-
all,. contaln the foundation tor a oommon ld.a). 'eirce, however, 
while admitting that e",et'1th1ng that we know 18 m.ental, ne.er-
thele'a .alnta1ns that what 1. known by the mind o:rlginate. not 
in the mind but ln the objective world. !hus the relatlona, 
or universals, ot Which w. have knowledge, exlst Independently, 
a. is evldenced by their .tubbornn ••• and Intractablilty. that 
... r r 
13 CP. 4.234. 
18 
... 
1', by the tact that every mind nec.s.ar117 draws the same 
Ideas trom l1ke things. In hi. own worda. 
All human thought and opinion containa an arbitrary, 
accIdental elament, dependent on the l1mitatlons In 
circumstancea, power, and bent ot the indIvidual, 
an element ot error, In short. BUt human opinIon 
universally tend. In the long run to .. definite torm, 
Whioh i. the truth. Let 8n7 human being have enough 
intONation and exert enougb ~t. upon &nJ' que.-
tio1'1. and the re8ult vll1 be that he will arrive 
at •• ertain detinite conclu.lon, which 1. the .ame 
that &n7 other m1nd will reaoh under suffioiently 
tavorable clroum.t.nce •• l~ 
Nominalism. cannot admit an 818men t In thIngs eich would toree 
all minds to derl ..... imilar Ideas trom them. 
Thi. ~ ot PeIrce" ar,~.nts oan be concluded 
by 80me taken tl'ODl the evidence ot .clenoe. Although Peirce 
w.a a reali8t b7 at 1 ••• ' 1811,15 he do •• not •• em to have 
comprehended the realism. ot seienoe until atter reading the 
introductIOn to Abbott. Sclentlt!! .... 'lh_._i ... _ .... , which did not appeap 
until 1885.16 At any rate, atter that time he u.ed thi. ammu. 
nit1011 al.o 111 hi •••• ault. upon nominali... "Ph7.1oal aelen08," 
• 
14 Charle. Sanders Peirce, "RevIew ot Alexander 
Campbell Fraser'. Edltlon ot the Works ~~;org, Berkelex," 
The North American Rey!e", exI!I lI811), . • 
• 
15 Hl. review ot Jra •• r'. Berkel't give •• uttioleni 
prOff or thl.. aetore tre.t1ng ot serietey 1m.elt, Pelree 
apends ten page. rri1e,,1ng the v1c18si tude. ot reall_ through 
the later 'MiddleA8ea and following perlod •• 
16 OP. 1.20. "Upon comparing h1. (Abbot. ao wr1tlns 
wlth mine, it Ii e •• 117 .een that the.e teature. ot nominalism 
¥nich I pointed out In .elence are .erely .uperlieial and 
tran.ient." 
19 
p8irce .tate~ tn 1902, "glves ita as.ent ••• to scholastic 
,-eal1am. tt17 A tev years later: ttAtter physical science haa 
di.covered so many general prinCiples in Nature, nominalism 
becomes a disgraceful habitude ot thOught. nlB Againz 
No mistake oan be greater than to suppose that ock-
hami.tlc thought i8 naturally allied to the concep-
tions ot modern soience. it is anti.scientific in 
••• ence. A scientif10 man Whose onl1 metaphysic. 
has been .uch ... hi. own studi •• have suss •• ted vill 
be detinitely adver •• to the Ide.s of Ockham. and. 
so tar •• his simple oonceptlon. go, will agree with 
seotue.1'l 
Nominalism i8 lastly inconsistent with acience because it delib-
erately blocks ott the road ot inqui~, which it is prect •• ly 
the function and a1m ot sclence to keep open. -It ls one ot 
the peculiaritie. ot nOD11nall_ that 1. is continually suppos-
ing things to be absolutely inexplicable_ H20 Aocording to tne 
nominalists, "we co.e up, bump against actions absolutely unin-
telligible and inexplicable, where human inquiries have to stop.H2 
NOW that it haa been shown how Peirce explicitly re-
jected nominalism, an explanatlon ot hi. own system ot realism 
1s in order. The task wl11 not be eaay, tor as one author 
17 CPt 6.)61. 
-
18 CP .. 6.175. 
-
19 CP, 2.166. 
-
20 elP" 1.170-
-
21 lbid. 
'" , 
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points out .... "In spite ot this volwu.1nousne •• it is amazins 
that a olear or conci ••• tatement of his realis. is not to be 
round in his wrlt1ng •• ,,22 Neverthele •• , it the problem 1s 
attacked in the way that Peirce saw it, it aay at least set 
the que,t1on In .. clearer llght it it does not render the 
actual task ot del1neat1ng hi',reallam so.ewhat e.sier. The 
method, then, tnat Peirce used to get at reality, namely. his 
phena..enolo8Y and oategorles, must be explained. 
Metaphysica, Or the acienoe that govern. a realistic 
philoaophy, must, aocording to Peiroe, rest on observation: 
Metaphysios, even bad metaphysios, really rests on 
observationa, whether conscloual'1 or- not, and the 
only r-eason that this 1. not unlver-sallT reoognized 
i. that 1 t relt. upon kinds of phenomena wi tb. which 
every man'. exper1enoe i. 80 saturated that h. usuall,. 
pay. no partIcular a ttentlon to them. The data ot 
metaphysics are not les8 open to observation. but 
imnaeaaurably more 80, than the data. au, ot the veXT 
highly developed seienoe ot a.tronaml. cJ 
It the dependence of metaphysics on ob.ervatlon were bettav 
known, the system Itself would be more patent to the observer. 
Hene. phenomenologJ {or pbanero.ooP1 a. Peiree variou8ly name. 
It} must be the f1rst atep toward. a realism, as it i. b, 
phenomenology that one t. ob •• rvatlon 1. sharpened. The purpose 
ot ~lh.nomenologIJ or the Dootr1ne of categories • • • 1. to 
22 JU.tU8 BUehler, Charl •• '.ircets Em21riola., 
London, 1939, 123. 
23 el, 6.2.. 
-
2l 
unravel the tang1e4 skein (ot] all that in any sen •• appears 
and wind 1 t into distinct tOl"lUJ 02" in other words, to Blake 
tlbe ultimate analysis ot all experiences the tirst task to 
wh1ch philosophy has to apply 1t8.1t."24 Phenomenology 1. 
that "pl'el1min&J7' inqu117" which i. aimed preci •• ly at aiding 
• person to beoo.e conscious o~ ~at h. observe., it 1s a 
".olenoe that do.s not dra. any d1stinotion. of good and bad 
in any •• na. whatever, but ju.t contemplatea phenomena u they 
are, 8impl,. opena It. ey •• and d.scrib.s what it .... , not what 
1t a.e. in the real a. distinguished trom tlgment ..... not regarding 
an, such diehot~--but s1mply describing the object, .a a 
phenomena, and stating what it tinda 1n all phenomena alike ... 25 
The subject matter of phaneroacopy 1s the phaneron, or pheno-
menon, which 1s "the collectlve total of all that i8 in any 
way or ln any aen •• present to the mind, quite regardl.s. ot 
whether 1 t oorNsponds to any real thlng or not ... 26 As stu-
dents ot phenomenology, then, all w. have to do 
-
i8 simply open our mental eyes and look well at the 
phenomenon and .ay .nat are 'he oharaoteristlcs tnat 
are never wanting in it, ~.ther that phena.enon be 
.~.th1ng that outward experlence tore •• upon our 
attentlon. or whether it be the wild.at of dreama, 
Or wh.ther it be the most aba'Not and sen.ret]. ot 
24- .2!, 1.280. 
25 CP, 
-
5.37. 
26 CP. 1.264,. 
-
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the conoluslon. ot a01.no •• 27 
The phaneron. or object of phenomenolog. 1. not 
.omething .ubJeettve, such •• would be expreased by the English 
word idea. Por 1dea has a p.,.oho1ogieal oonnotation whioh 
-
,eirce wlahed to avoid. That the phan.ron 18 not In idea 1. 
olear trom thil tactt In the ~er,. breath ot laying "tnere 1. 
nO suoh idea" as this or that, un. phaneron 1n que.tion i. 
definitely des.rib.d. Pelrce in 1898 reprimanded HUllerl tor 
having hopele.aly tied up the foundationa ot hi. phenomenology 
in psychological oomplicationa , although both men.gree that 
phenomenology 1s an attempt to tocul attention on the universal 
or ••• entia! elements ot the Phenomena. 28 
, Phenomenology, then. 18 not a subject1ve lo1entH9J nOr 
11.1 1 ta prjJ'IUlry concern ,,1 th the real. aut 1t the.. two po •• lbi-
11tl •• are preclud.ed, Just where doe. one' a lntereat l1e 1n 
atudy'lng the ao1ence' 1'be phenomenolog1st 1s •• eking to gener-
alise the direct observations he has mad., to signaliae •• vera1 
27 CP, 5.41. 
-
28 Frank '.!hilly, A H18to~ or PhilosOPBl, revi.ed by 
Ledger Wood, New York, o.9Sld, S~~:o 0:- I.e 0', '4.7, where 
Peirce .ay. that BUsserl ia one or those vrit.~. ot our genepa-
tion who, Matter underscored pPOte.tationa that their diacourae 
shall be ot logic exclus1vely and not by any means or paycholog7 
(almost all logiCians protest that on t11e), forthwith become 
intent upon those elements of the procesl ot th1nking wh1ch 
leem to be speeial to a mind like that ot the human race, as ve 
~ it, to too great neglect ot those elementa which muat-oel ... 
a. muili to anyone as to 81'11' other mod. ot embodying the a ... 
thought. ft 
23 
... 
•• ry broad claaaes ot phenomena, describing the features ot each 
with the result that, altnough they will be seen as lnextricablr 
1I1xed together, yet their characters will appear manIfestly 
qui te disparate, as they tall under a short list ot b,aad cate-
gorles. 29 ae i8 t17ing·. to aart out the phanerons into their 
indecOmposable elements, ehloh can be done in two ways: 81thflr 
according to the form or structure ot the elements, or accord1ng 
to their matter. Att_. two years ot labor on the latter P8irce 
•• certained that a division according to the matter was beyond 
his powers, wheretore he divIded the phenomena into oategorie. 
according to their sttr\4oture.'O Even this 1. not an e..,. task, 
however, :for three faculties in pal'"t1culat' are required in order 
that one may ob.en. correctly what 1s presented to him.. '!hat 
first ot these i. ~the faculty or .eeing vnat stares one in the 
faceft , .econdly, the faculty ot "resolute discrimination which 
tastens itself 11ke a bulldog upon the partlcular feature that 
ve are studying, tolloW8 1t wherever lt may lurk, and detects 
1i beneath all ita di.gu1.e."J t1nall,., the tacult,. whioh con-
ter. ftthe generalizing power of the mathematio1an who produoe. 
the abstract tOl'Dlu].a that comprehend. the ve'1!1 easence of the 
feature under examinat10n purifled trom all adm1.xture ot extra-
29 CP, 1.266. 
-
.30 CP, 1.268. 
-
neoUS and irrelevant aocompaniments.-31 
When William Jamel complained ot un. novelty ot the 
three categorle •• ,e1rce admitted that perhaps he did not have 
the clea~at not1ons posaible ot th«ml 
It rather annoys me to be told that there il an,. ... 
t.~lng novel in m., three categorie., tor it they have 
not, however cantu.edt." "en recognized b7 men line. 
men began to think, that condemns them at once. To 
make them a. distinct a8 it is in their nature to be 
ls, however, no small talk. I do not suppose they 
are 80 in M7 own m1nd} and eVidently, it 1s not ill 
their nature to be aa sharp aa or~1nar., concepta. J2 
However, "the three oategories are supposed to be the three 
kinds ot elements that attantive perception Cad make out in 
the phenomenon.·)) The.e three indecomposable elements are 
called by Peirce quality, tact (or reaction), and law (or re-
presentation). They are aleo known in hIs writings as monad, 
dyad, and trlad. 34 But most commonly he reter. to them as 
Fl~8tne •• , seoondne.8, and T.hIrdne8s, tor these terms carry 
with them no other oonnotations. 35 Thes. eategories, which 
tON the basi. of his phIlosoph,., must now be explained sepa ... 
31 CP, 5.42. 
-
32 Letter or lune'8, 1903, to Wl1111.1'fl Jame., quoted 
by Per17 in.l'!l! Tbo~t ~ Charaeter !!! Wlll;i~ Jl81es, II, 
428-429. 
.33 Ibid., 429. 
34 CP, 1.293. 
-
35 CPt 4.3J 5.121. 
-
,-atel,.. 
Firatn ••• 1s the tirst ot Pa1r-ce t s three tundamental 
ontological eategories. "Categorr the Firat 1s the Idea ot that 
_loh is 8uch as it i. regardl ••• ot anything &1 se. ]hat 1s to 
.. ,., 1t ls"a gua11tz ot Feeling","36 It is predominant in the 
ideas ot trsannes., 11te, treedom. The tree 1s that Wh1ch hat 
noGhing behind It to dete%"Dlinelts actions. (And insotar .a 
the ide. ot negation ot another enters, the idea ot 81 other 
el'lters, and thus the Flrstness i8 spoiled by an admixture ot 
secondness.)37 Firstnes8, 1n tact, "i8 so tender that you can-
not touch it without spoiling it,,,)8 and the minute you begin 
to think about it it loses its element of pure Firstneas. What 
does Peirce mean by Firstness? flT.Ue color ot magenta, the odor 
ot attar, the sound ot a railway whistle, the taste ot quinine, 
the quality ot the emotion upon contemplating a tine mathematioal 
demonstration, the quality of teeling of love,,39 are all example. 
of Fir.tness", Again Peirce says: 
Imagine me to wake and in a slumberous condition to 
have a vague, unobJectltled, atlll less unaubJect1tlea, 
•• n •• 0' redne.l, or ot salt t.at., or of an aChe, or 
ot grlef or 307, or ot a prolonged musical note. That 
36 .2!!, 5.66. 
37 CPt 1.302. 
,38 cP, 
-
1.3S8. 
39 CPt 
-
1.304. 
would be, aa n.a~~ a. po •• lble, a purely aonadic 
state ot feeling. 
Fl~atne88, then, 1. a qualityJ but thls notion of 
quality yet ~.malna to be investigated. Quallty must not be 
thought ot in It. paychological atatus, but mu.t be t~an.­
tarred to ••• taph,..lcal concept1on, which perceives qualit,. 
.. a pure nature, in lt.elt wi thout p.~ts or re.tux-e ... and 
without embodiment. 41 Quality is not dependent, in Ita being, 
upon mind, nor upon the tact that aome material thing po ••• a.e. 
it. Quality mu.t not be confused "ith the .ense experience 
wbich makes qual1tles known to us. It i8 the nominalists who 
always maintained that quality does not exist wlthout sense. 
The realists, among them Peirce, have always denied this, and 
tought tor the oppaa1 te. "That qual 1 ty 1s dependent upon sense 
i. the great .rro~ ot the conceptualists. 7hat it ia dependent 
upon the .ubJect in which it is realized i8 the gr&at error ot 
all the nominalistic Ichools. ,,42 "1hat the quallt,. ot ~ed 
depends on anybod7 aotually seeing it, 80 that red things are 
no longer red in the dark, 1s a denial ot COll'.lmOn sens .... 4.3 
"A realist," it 18 true, "tully admit. that a .ense-quallty 
40 CP, 
-
1.)0). 
41 Ibid. 
42 CP, 1.422. 
-
43 Ibid. 
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t. only a po •• ibllity ot senaation", but 8till Rhe think. a 
,o •• ibllity remain. possible when it is not actual_ q44 Quality. 
then, -7 be detined a& a "mere abstract potential! t'1, and the 
error ot those [nom1nall.tl~ .ohool. liea in holding that tn. 
potential, or pOS8ible, Is nothing but what the actual. mak •• 1 t 
to be,,"4~ Thu. quality 1& an .. xte:rnal thIng, independent at 
the mind,46 a possibility which .en •• experienoe mayor ma7 not 
actualize, but which in &nJ cas. is independent ot such actual-
lze.tlon. 47 
Lastly the relation ot Pirstnea. to general1ty should 
be noted. Perhaps it would aeem that a quality could only be 
partioular, slnce it 1. a kind ot consciousness which involves 
no analysi" comparison, or any process ~at.oever, aor conslata 
in a proce.s by Whioh one stretch ot consc1ousnea. i. di.tin-
44 ~l?\d. 
4S Ibid. Pelrce'a us. ot "po •• ibilit,," or "abstract 
potentlall~th.re clo •• ly approachea the leholaetic notion ot 
potency_ He points out that the error ot the nominalists 11.s 
in maintaining that the whole alone 11 something, and its com-
ponents, however essential to it, are nothIng. f-hU8 the qualIt7 
ot red can be the power the red th1ng has ot causing a senaatlon 
of red, even though the object may be here and now in the d.ark. 
For the red qualIty to become actua11zed, sensation 1s ne.dedl 
but no sensation or senae raoulty 1s requisite tor the possibI-
lity which is the being ot the quality_ 
46 CP, 6.)27. 
-
47 £!, 1.2$, 426. 
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gui8hed tro~ another. 48 Yet qualities oan rep ••• ent the genefal, 
.8 i. 1nstanced here, 
Imagine at onoe a toothache, a splitting headache, 
a jammed tinger, • oom on the toot, a bUl'n, and 
a colic, not ne •• ssarily a. exi.ting at once .. 1.a •• 
tha t vague-and at tend not to the par-ts ot the !magi-
nation but to the resultant impre.sion. Tcat v111 
g1ve an ide. of a general qua11ty ot pain.4~ 
fne 1dea at quality 1s thus the ide. ot a phenomenon considered 
•• a monad, without refer-enoe to ita parts or components or to 
anything el •• , and as such it cllnstand tor a general. 'When 
Peirce call. quality a monad, he i8 not t171ng to say that 
every quali t,. 1s .b1ple 1n the .en.e ot oontaining only one 
note. This would contradlot the notion Just described wheJte'by 
qualitJ' can r-.pr •• en't the general. Rather, the 1de. ot fluali tr 
considered a. a lIonad would corre.pond 80mewhat to an undit ... 
rerentlated simple apprehen.ion in whioh manJ' not •• are contained 
in the one Ide.,$O inaamuch aa the Idea 1. taken In 1t. total.l~ 
and not considered .. composed ot diver.e elementa. Thus qualit» 
although fundamentall., elmpl., oan be •• en .e general. when re. 
fleeted upon, tor what the qualIty can repre.ent i. general, 
and Revery quality 1., in it.elt, general_">l 
48 CP, 1.306. 
-49 cP f 1.424. 
-
" $0 see Peter Hoenen, 8.J., La Tneorie de JHi~ent 
d'apre • .ll. Thoma. qt Aquln, Rome, 1946;-lG. -
(1 t!P 1 h.l.L 7 
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Thia last statement m., lead one to wonder how Peirce 
distinguIshed between the generalIty ot T.nIrdnea., which prl-
marily contalns the notion ot lav. and the generallty ot Firat-
nesa exhibited in the idea ot quality. lb. ditterence may be 
explained in this manner: Enough has been said of 'irstneas 
to ahow that it is that which the mind arrives at tirst. Thia 
first moment at sensation-or at least this a8em8 to be Peirce's 
interpretatlon-the tlrst moment ot sensation i IS general in the 
senae ot being undete~lni, or capable ot turtber dete~1natlon. 
'!hus what i. tirst apprehended 1s not an individual, but a 
general e.aence. As Pelrce statea, "Given any possible deter-
mination, there ls a po.aible further determ1nation."S2 !bu. 
the categorJ ot Thlrdnesa would still contain the generalIt7 
required tor unlvera.11t7. while the generality ot the category 
ot Flrstne.8 would be only that ot a nttlon that does not enJoy 
the perteotl,. Indivldual nature ot tacta, whlCh belong to the 
category ot secondn.ss. as will be •• en immediately. 
Secondness now merlts cons1deratlon. "category the 
second 1s the Idea ot that Which i8 such as it i8 aa be1ng 
Second to some Firat, regardle.s ot anything el... • •• '!bat 
i8 to say, it 1s Reaction as an element ot the Phenomenon • .,53 
. 
It ia predominant in the Ideas ot causation and ot atatlcal 
52 I~ld. 
S3 OP, 5.66. 
30 
... 
torce. For caus. and ettect are two, and stat1cal torces &1-
_a1' occur in paIrs. seoondnesl la also preda.lnant In the 
ide. ot reallty, tor the real 1. that whioh Inslst. upon torc~ 
ing 1 ts wa"1 to reoognl tlon .s 80me thlng 0 thep than the mlnd f 8 
creatlon.53• 
Secondnes. 18 the next simpl.st el .. ent thateames 
betore the mlnd, the taot ot struggle. StandIng on the outslde 
ot • door that ls sllghtly ajar, you put your band on the knob 
to open it. You experience an un.een, .1lent re.lstance. This 
is the second. Secondn... 1. tound even in the reellng ot a 
.ingle quality. For to concentrate steadl1y on one slngle 
feeling that never changes auppo.es a knack of mental manipu-
lation whlch exolude. all other 1ncomlng data. But this re.i8-
tance oould not be had wlthout struggle or forcetul action. 
Thua Seoondne.s i. tound 1n all .Q'Ul' reaotlons, yet doe. not 
involve T.hiJ"dne •• , tor .t~Blle 1. 8Impl,. a mutual aotion be. 
tween two things l'ega1"dle.s of a1l7 80rt ot third or lIutdlum, 
and In particular regardle.s ot any law ot actIon.S4 
Sla OP, 1.12S. Not!ee that the ide. of reallty first 
Comes up in conneotion with S.condn.... ThIs is not the reality 
ot _hiloaoph,. baaed on a theol'T ot univer.als 1fhlch are tound-
.d in things, but rather reali.m a. oppo.ed to idealism. 1hat 
ls, in Firstn •• s the quality is Just "given," wl thout .aring 
whether it i8 outside the mind or not. In Seoondne •• real o~ je.ta are a •• erted ~lch toroe th .... lv •• On eonsoiouan ••• tram 
outside. Thi. say. nothing as yet about whether these real ob-jects are merely di.parate individual., or Whether they have 
something in common. 
~h t!'P. 1. "!to 't!o)!t 
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It Plrstneas 1. qualIty, a aomewhat vague and poten-
tial thing, Seoondne •• i. taot, 80mething pertectl,. individual. 
It happens here and now.;; The tacta in wnich Seeondn ••• 1. 
verifled must exclude all reteNnee to the general, and with 
·It the permanent ox- eternal. Fox- "generalit,. is eIther ot that 
negative lort whlch belongs to' the .erel,. potential, a. auoh, 
and this 18 peculiar to the oategory ot quallt,.. or It Is ot 
that poaitlve kind which belongs to conditional nece •• it,., and 
this ls peculiar to the category or law. ";6 (Thirdne.s) This 
leulv •• tor the categol')' or fact the followings the contingent, 
or the accidentall,. actual, and toree without law or reason, 
brute toroe. (For tact., ina.much as the,. reala' the will, are 
.. 
proverbiall,. Called brutal.) 
Seoondne.I, then, while excluding the general, ,.et 
in a vel')' true .en.e inolude. the real, indeed almost constl-
tut •• 1t. "For the .ingular object is real. and reality 1. 
inaiateno1_ That i. 1itlat we mean b,. trealIt,._ t It i. the 
b:ru te irrational insi. tenc,. that torce. us to acmowledge the 
reallty of what we experlence. that givel UI our conviction ot 
56 .2l. 1.421. In the negatiT. generality there can 
perhapi be •• en a parallel to prime matter, which i, univeraal 
negativel,. inaSMUch as it i8 in potency to all torm., wh.reas 
the positIve generallt,. would be sim1lar to a uniTersal pro-
perly SO-Called. 
32 
any singular~"57 Brute oppos1tion requ1res that everything in 
the field ot actuality should be individual, "Hio et nune 1" 
-
the phra.e perpetuall" 1n the mouth ot Duns Sootus, who first 
,lucidated individual exiatence. n58 
The 1de. ot •• cond, tinally 1s easier to comprehend 
than that ot tirst. Fir.tne •• ¥aa found to be so tender that 
fOU could not touch 1t without apolling it, but Seoondne.8 "is 
eminently hard and tangible •••• With what tlrstne •• 
'The acarfed bark puts trom her native bay}' 
with what .econdness 
With overweathered ribs and ragged salls.· 
~~~th she return, 
Firstnes8 i8 independent ot Seoondnes8, but Secondnes8 is depen-
dent upon Firstness inasmuch as it consiats In opposition of 
a .econd quality to the t1rst quality, But this will suttice 
tor Secondness, tor 1blrdn.s. yet remains to be explained. 
"category the Third Is the Idea ot that which i. auch 
aa it is aa being a Third, or Med1um, between a Seoond and its 
First. That Is to say, it is Representation aa an element ot 
the Phenomenon ... 60 Some predOminant ideaa ot ThirdMsa whioh 
S7 CP, 6.340. Attention 1s called to note 53a abov., 
where it was sEOwn that the rea11t7 ot Seoondne.s 1. that opposed 
to idealism, and not necessarily a s7atem ot universals. 
S8 CP, 1.458. 
-
59 ep, 1.358. 
-
60 CP, 5.66. 
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...,.. important in philosoph,. anel leience are senerality, 1ntlnlt,-, 
continuity, mean1ng, growth and intelligence. "A fork in a 
stOat! 18 a thIrd, it suppa ••• three waYBJ a straight road, con-
,idered merely .s a connectlon between two plaoe. 1s •• dond, 
bUt 80 tar &It It implie. pa.aing through intermedIate places 
it 1s third • .,'l 
~lrdness 1. the medium or eonnect1ngbond between 
the absolute f1rst and 1e.t. It "1a nothing but the cha~acter 
of an object Which embodies Betweenn ••• or Mediation in ita 
,1mple.t and moat rud~.ntary for.m.,,62 The character ot Tnird-
ness i. "mediatIon, wnereb,. a first and aecond are brought into 
relatIon."') Thirdness, for in.tance, i8 ~ean~, whioh stands 
tor the object and 81v •• 1'1.41 to the ide., 1ts ;nter,eretant. 
Again it 1. the "proce •• intervening between" causal act 
and the effect. ,,64 1hul it oan be ••• n 018ar11 that Thirdne •• 
1. a medium, a link, a oormeotlng bond. But thl. does not leem 
to give it the character ot law or generalIty that Pelrce 
claimed tor it. Whence do theae come' 
The general content ot Th1rdn.ss will become somewhat 
clearer It notice 18 taken of the fact that the phaneron pe~-
61 
62 
.. 
6,3 CPt 6.32. 
-
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• its us to make reliable toreoaats ot the tuture. "Five minutes 
ot our waking lit e W~ll hardl)" pa8s wi thou t our making 80me 
kind ot predlctlonJ and in the maJorlt7 ot oase8 these predio-
tions are fult 111 ed In the even t ... 65 Suoh pe8\llarl ty In the 
toretelling ot tuture events would be utterly unintelligible 
were tbe phane:ron a thing whlch· vas merel,- partlcular. That 
oannot be 1 ts statua. It must oontain somethlng whlch 11nks 
it to lilat 18 to happen, and to what haa happened, whlch aome. 
thing can on!,- be an element ot generall t7, tor the very process 
of prediotion i8 ot a general nature, reterring, in the maJor1t1 
of ca ••• , not to a un1quel)" apeoltic outcome, but to a general 
kind ot ~utoom.e. When a cook, tor instance, tollow8 the tnstruo-
tions in her recipe-book tor making an apple pie, ahe oan pre-
dict that an apple pie vill t-e8ult, but she cannot predict the 
- -
.pecitic apple pie which will be produoed. 66 She de.ires a 
certain k1nd ot object. She moreov.roteels confident that 
the reCipe wiUJrOduce the d •• ired result, that 18, she t.els 
that her prediction haa a tendency to be tultilled.67 Yet thi8 
"is to 8ay that the tuture events are in a _.aure reall)" gov-
65 cP, 1.26. 
-
66 CP, 1 • .34l. 
-
67 s •• Goudg., 'lhO;w0t.2!.£. • .a. Peirce, 91-92. 
lS 
.med b'1 a £aw. ,,68 Generallt'1 and law are the heart of Third-
nesa, and Peirce .ehementl,. stressed thls pOint: "1hla mode 
o! being which consists, mind nrr word it ,.ou pleue, the mode 
o! being which conslst. in the tact that future tacta of Second-
o 
nesa will take on a determinate general character, I call a 
',lt1irdne88. ,.69 And againt Thlrdnes8 "is that Which 18 what it 
1. by virtue of imparting a quality to reactions in the tu-
ture." 70 
The va,. that words are used demonstrat.. bow Third-
ness aa law intervene. in the phaneron 0,1' meaning. Every 
general term 1mplies an inexhaustible series ot conditional 
prediotions, In allot Whioh it will be verltied. Take &nJ 
predicate: 
I sa,. ot a stone that it 1s hard. That meana that so 
long a8 the .tone remains ha~eve17 e.sa)" to scratch 
it .by the moderate pressure ot a knlte willsurel,. 
tall. To call the stone hard i8 to predict that no 
matter how otten 70U, t1!7 me .%peraent, it will tail 
every ttme. ~at innumerable .eries ot condItional 
predictions ia Inv~lv.d in the meaning ot this lowly 
adjective. Whateve~ may haXl been done will nct be. 
gin to exhauat ita meaning. (J. 
!he word ~ he~e expre.ses a law that will hold true tor an 
indefinite ttme. In 11ke manner, the vaat majorit)" of words are 
68 CP, 1.26. 
-
69 Ibid. 
-
10 CP, 1.343. 
-
." 1'1) 1 ",'t!' 
-
.aturated with the regularlty ot fhirdn.al. 
The rea.on tor this 1., aa was mentloned above, the 
tr1ad1c function ot a ~bol of meanlng. Unless the symbol, 
It. object, and the interpretant are pre.ent, the symbol haa 
no meaning. When thes. three are present. however, the symbol 
i' meaningtul. '!hus an even c],.earer explanation Is had tor 
p.irceta synonyms tor Thlrdne8., Representation or Mediation. 72 
The pOint to be noticed here 1n peirc.'. system is 
not 80 much the tact that he haa a general law, but rather the 
principle behind that law. For the a.holaatics, a th1ng is 
hard not because 1t will re.ist scratching 1n the tuture, but 
because 1t has .. definIte quiddlt,y whereby 1t 1. hard here and 
now, without anT reterence to the tuture. Thus the ••• ence 
a. a nature (ErincipiUlJl 0R.ration!.) work. 1n a deflnlte manner 
becaus. 1t already depends upon the e •• ence as auch (s.uod iuid 
eat) ot the object. Pe1rce .eems to mis. thIs point, and his 
-
meanIng ot the universal. ia not tounded on the e ••• nOe ot the 
thing, but il related to the id ••• or predIction, law, operatlcn, 
and ettect, thul plaolng the .s.enoe or the univer.al 1n a 
relation to another event. It leems that Peirce, instead of 
aiming at finding out what a thIng really la, and at derining 
ita true nature, rather aims at deacribing how. thing behaves 
1n various circUM.tance., and e.pecially, whether there are any 
37 
,.gularltle; 1n its behavior. 7) The soholastlol never aplit 
the dual notion ot •• senoe .. qulddl t7 and u n. ture. wh.r .... 
p8irc. seems to have retained onl7 the notion ot essence •• 
nature, and to have rejected the Ide. ot qulddlty aa IOmething 
distinct tram the ettects Vblch the thing produoe •• 
Be this •• it ma7. the representative and general 
character ot Thlrdnass giv.. to the category a teature which 
peirce alludes to frequentl,. in the 0loll •• !e.! paper~. Thirdn ••• 
• arks ott hi. philosophy .a a realism .et o.er against the nomi .... 
naliam Which 18 pampant 10 moder.n cirol... But the que.tlon 
might be ra1s.d whether phenomenQloQ can b. the baai. tor a 
reallam. Doe. the tpiad on whioh representation and generality 
are b .... d tall under the obs.rvational method proper to ph_no-
•• nol0ta', or doe. it inolude an element not given in sbaple 
observation? 'eiroe would .a,. that fbirdne.s 18 reached b7 
observation, and hi. reasons are the... Although the general. 
1s not direetl,. perceived in the partioular ("an extraordinaril,. 
orude oplnionft74), tor "the ,ea. pal is not oapable of tull 
actuallz .. tion 1n the world or actlon and reaction but is ot the 
73 Se. thls passage, tor instance: "The predloate, 
hardness, ls not invented by men, .s the word la, but 18 real17 
and iru!,. in the hard things and ls on. 1n the. all. a. a 
d.scr1,tion or hablt, dlsp;osltlon, or behavior. CP, r.i1n. 
TtlasE tille.not Iii ttle orlgInal.)- -
74 CP, 2.26. 
-
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nature of what 1s thOught. w7$ atill it i. part of th. phaneron, 
tnd 10 can be detected by phenomenological observation. Thua 
phenomenology and T.hirdness in pa~tlcular can aerve as the 
ba.i. tor a realistic philosophy_ And it 1s $uch a ~ealistlc 
philosophy that Pei~ce claims to have constructed. The final 
ta.k of this chapter will be, therefore, to examine Peirce" 
realism. First 80me 11m! ts 11111 be placed to hi. rea11sm by 
,howing what it i8 not, and then a prelim1nli1Ll7 formulation of 
the doetrt .. vill be worked out. 
l:be distinction between r8&li_ .a opposed to ideal1_ 
and realism •• opposed to nomina11sm has already been 1ndicat.d. 
Although this thesi. is primarily ooncerned with realism in 
the .econd sense as opposed to nominalism, a ahort vindication 
of Peirce'. reali .. a. opposed to idealism Ihould be under-
taken just to ahow that Peirce 1s vo:rking with real things. 
Texts in .nioh Pel:rce maintains the reality of things 
independent ot the workings ot the mind are numerous, and could 
be multiplied almost ad infinitum. The following are •• leeted 
- , 
as typical, "What, then. 1. a 5ualitzt Betore answer-ing this, 
it will be well to say what It i8 not. It i. not an,-thing 
1rIhich 1s dependent, in ita being, .pon m.ind, wbether 1n the 
tom ot •• nse or in that of thought. ,,76 W1hat ia real which 
39 
!la. such ant such characters, whether anybod,. think. it to hay. 
tb0,8 characterl or not."77 ftThat which an,. true proposition 
aa.erts i.!!!i, in the .enae ot being as 1t is regardless ot 
What you or I may th1nk about 1t.n78 "For the singular object 
l' real. and reality 18 inaistenc,.. That Is cat we mean by 
trealitr.' It i. the brute irrational inSistency that torces U8 
to acknowledge the reality of what ve experience, that giv •• ua 
our conTietion ot an,. .ingular. n79 
In addition to this explicIt contention that extra-
mental objects exist, one may ask whe~.r P.,lree eTer detI-
nitely rejected idealia. verbatim. Th. question would be well 
put, and perhapa a lIttle difficult to anawer. paaaage. IUch 
a. the tollowing throw at firat a dubious 11gb t on P.iroean 
realism, but hi •• xPlanation will .how the d1st1notion he $Ada 
to avoid idealism: 
This 1deal tirst i8 the partIcular thing-tn-itselt. 
It doea not exist .a auoh. ~t ia, there 1s no thing 
which 1. 1n.1ts.lr-Yn~ .en.e ot not being relati.e 
!~~:o:~~:.!b~~ !;!~.t=!c~h:e,.:~!:~!~~8ao the 
Except tor the final aaving adversative claus., this atatement 
18 CP, 5.432. 
-
79 Cf.t 6 • .340. 454 ... 13"-
80 .2!, 5' • .311. 
See al80 oP, 5.311, 405, 408, 565. 
-
$ •• alao Sf, 5.401. 6, 349. )93, 453. 
S.e also oP, 2.3371 6.)27. Fras.r'. 
-
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'" i' very clos. to ideal1... That 1el1"'Oe desired a l'ealiam, 
though, aeem. to be apparent t.oa the emphaSis he u •• d later 
in the same parag:raph. 
And what do we mean by the l'eal' It i8 a oonception 
whioh we must tlrat have had when we diacoyered that 
there was an unreal, an illu.ion; that 18. when we 
tirst corrected o~selve.. Now the distInction tOr 
whiQh alone thIs tact log.t:call.7 oell.", vaa between 
an ena relative to prIvate inward determinations, to 
the-nigatlona belonging to idl08,ncra.1, and an en. 
auch aa would stand in the long pun. '!he peel, m'n, 
Is that which sooner or later, tntormation and rea-
sonIng would tinal1,. Haul t ln, and which 1. there-
tope independent ot the .aga1'ies ot me and :rou. 
'eiree el.ewhere 8mpl0'18 a more trontal. at tack on 
idea11sm: 
BUt what evidence 1s there that we can imme-
d1ate17 know on!,. what 18 'pr •• ent~ to the m1nd' 
The 1deali8ts g.n.~lly tpeat this aa .elt-evident) 
but, as 011£tord jestingl,. &a7., tIt i8 evident' 1s 
a phra8S2vhlch only means 'we do not know how to prove. , 
He then continuesl 
-
Obvlou81y, then, the tirst move toward beating ideal-
i_ at its own game 1s to l"emarlt that w. apprehend 
our O'Wtl Idea. onl,. .a tloving in time, and since 
nel ther the tutuN nor the past, ho .... v.r near th.,. 
may be, i. 2re.ent. tbere i •• a much diftioulty in 
conceivlng our perceptlon ot what passes wi thin ua 
.a In conoeivlng external. pepception. • • • Once 
spant immedIate knowledge 1n t1me, and vhat 'become_ 
ot the Idealiat th.orr that we tmmedlatel,. know 0ne% 
the presentt For the present can contain no time. ~ 
81 Ibid. 
82 Cl, 1.38. 
-
8) Ib14. 
... 
%D discussing Kant t 8 Cx-ltl~ .!! !!!.! Pm:e Reason, PelH. again 
.. oome. explicit! "But we ha.e direet _!Rarienee .2!. thinS. !!! 
.-,mselve.. Nothing can b. more compl.tely tal.e than that we 
.- . 84 
.an experlence only our own ld.aa." ot Berk.ley he sayal 
-'!'he thought thinking and the !mIaediate thought-object are the 
"'1!1sam. thing regarded trom dirterent points or view. There .... 
tore; Berkele.,. was, ao tar, .ntirely in the x-ight, al though he 
blundex-ed when from that manit •• t truth he int.rred his ideal-
l.m. ,,8S 
It might be in place to ask ~.ther, despite hi. re .... 
j.ction ot idealism, Peiroe held any type of phenomenalism 81mi-
lar to that of william J.... Phenomenal idealiam .a taught by 
Jam ••• tate. that the objects ot knowledge are not things, nor 
the real. appearances ot things, but their appearance •• a they 
are viewed within the mind. In other wox-dB, the only rea11 ty 
i8 .en.ationa a8 we experience them. Jame.' syatem 1"e1i88 on 
this px-1nclple at .vePy turn, as ia evidenced by this .hort, 
but characteriatic, selectlon: "Now mJ contention i8 exactly 
the reverse ot this. EXperienee, I believe, haa no such inner 
dupliclty. and the s.paration ot 1 t into consciousness and con-
tent cOlne., not bT val" of aubtractlon, but b7 way ot add1tion. tt86 
- 84 .9l., 6,95. 
85 CP, 6.339, 
-
86 William. Jamea, Easals !! Radical Empiric1sm, New 
• 
... 
to put the tact baldly, Jame. preaohe. that sensation is me:rel'1 
an navarene.s Gt" withGut being an "awarenes. ot a dietinct 
reality," a me:re subje.tIve atate whICh doea not poalt an ex-
,.rnal :real! t,. other than the very sensation. 
~e tact that peirce denied any sort ot Platonic en-
tlt1 or substance behInd the appearances ot thlngs86a may seem 
$0 neces.itate hI. adoption ot phenomenali •• , toll owing the a .. e 
pattern as Jam... Not so, however .. tor Peiree did not make the 
.ame identltication ot subjeot and object that James did, and 
henee tor Peiroe the oorN_pond.noe theory 01 tputh still had 
aeaning.87 1bIa Is con-oborated by' what has at ready been 8ald 
about the oategory ot Firstn ••• , whioh haa been shown to be • 
quality which !!tIs not 8l7thing which 1. dependent, in its being, 
upon mind, whether in the form ot sen.e or in that ot thOUght_ .. e 
Again " .. t la ,teal Whioh has such and such oharactera, whether 
anybody thinks it to have tho •• oharacters or not ... e8 In thes. 
66. In not. 89 It is Shown how pelpce f s denial ot 
aub.tance doe. not nece.sarily lead htm to a denial or real 
thing •• 
87 S.e Jam •• vue! Smith, ttprapati •• Real1am, and 
Positlvism in the United stat •• ,· Mind, LXI. April, 19$2, 8.pe-
elally 191, 193, 19$, 198, where tiSiiiuthor show. that Peiroe 
11m! ted the pragmatIcs mu1m to the que.tlon ot meaninth and 
41d not 1. t 1 t lnter.re:r-e w1 th the theo!7 ot tath, Whereaa 
Jame. Jconstantly muddled theory or meaning and theory ot truth," 
87a .2l. 1.422. 
88 .£l.. $'.430. 
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~d many other plaoea Pe1ree not onl,. rejects absolute 1deali_, 
but alsO demands that real objects exiat aeparate troll the 
thought of them, thus repudlating pheno •• nal ideal1sm a180. 
Having now eatablilhed that Pe1rce held that there 
were existent singulars which do not depend upon the mind for 
their beIng,89 the next task la. to see what kind ot reali t7 ia 
oharacter1st1c of these s1ngulars. Are the,. merely grouped ta. 
,ether under eonvel'Jient cl.ssifica tiona 1n a nominal 1st theo17? 
or are they unIversals 1n themselves, p~taking ot a Platoni., 
Or Is there 80me other poasibi11ty' Theae questiona deaerve 
oU'etul study. 
Peirce'a realism, taking realism now In the aeoond 
•• nse .a opposed to nomlnallsm, truly rejects the nominaliatic 
theory. Thi. i8 elear from the numerous refutat10ns of nom!-
nali8l11 given at the beginnlng ot this ohapter. Theztef'ore 
• 
89 !}'hi" thelia doe. not go into the que"tioD of just 
What the •• real things are. Pe1l"'Oe' 8 doctrine on aubatanee 
1. so_what ot a matter ot dispute, and 1 t would seem that he 
denled 1ts realIty, except Inamuch •• sub. tan •• ls a kind ot 
regular! ty or habit. (.2,l, 1.411) Cel"talnl,., however, he elaimed 
. that at lea.t accldenta were real, not ppeol.el,. _Iua accIdent. 
(tor a aubject would then be 1"equl1"ed) I but sua ppearins 
thlngs" 01" "glven." It ma,. be that Pe1X"Ce.a averalon to ad-
mitt1ng the exi.tene. ot subatance va. due to a reluotanee to 
embrace the Lockean idea or unknown aubatrate. B7 aaying that 
only qualities are real, Peirce mI.,. have been merel,. 1"eiteratl~ 
one ot the ba.ie tenets of re.ll_-that there 1e nothlng In 
l-eallty whlch 18 an unknown ~~an ... loh. Be that .a lt _y, 
he doe. admlt real thing., a~iP.to1". the questlon can be 
legitimately put whether the •• real object. are linked together 
in an,. kind ot generalitr. 
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doctrine ot realism fall. 80meWhere in that line ot 
"man, hor •• , and other na.n.. of natural 
-
s, correspond wi th twha\l all men, or all horses, reall,. 
in common, independent ot our thOught. n90 
Nor does Peiree'. reallsm entall a Platonlc world of 
I\1bal.tent ide.s or universal f'OrD18. ,e1roe asserts his stand 
on this matter tirmly. 
~~.ry realist must, &8 auch, admit that a general 1. 
a term and theretore a sign. It, in addltion, he 
holds that it ls an absolute exemplar, this Platonia 
paB.e. qulte beyond the queation ot nominall_ and 
reali .. , and indeed the doctrine ot Platoni~lideas 
haa been held by the extremest nominalist •• 
This passage was wr1tten towards the end of' Peiroe'l literary 
work. At the very beginning of' his career he had also adhered 
to this .ame opinion, tor in 1871 he had aaid: "The notion 
that the controvers,. between reali_ and nominali8lll had 8>. '1-
thlng to do with Platonio ideaa ls .. mere product of' the imagi-
nation, .nich the s11ghtest exam1nation of the books would 
turrice to d18ProV •• ft92 
Against thl. opinion, Felbleman93 contends that Pe1rce 
did hold a doctrine ot Platonio ide.s, and he bolsters his oon-
90 Fra.er'. fterkel!l, 454. 
<)1 CP, S.470. 
-
92 Fra •• r" Berkelel, 458. 
93 ,ntroductio~!2 Peirce's Philos0Pel, 179. 
.. 
tention by .e.e~al texts. Although the arguments are convincing 
at first eight, a clo •• r stud,. of the passage. in question stl11 
I.ems to allo~ the contrary interpretation. For instance, 
"irce 18 quoted a. saying that the ideas in the existing world 
are oft-shoot. from, or a:rbltra17 determinations of, a world 
ot ideaa, a Platonic world. 94 But what does Peiree underatand 
by the •• yet undeter:mined ide.s which exist in the Platonic 
world? In another text Peirce explains what he means by "an 
ide. that i. in no mind lt and whioh had not ,et attained full 
being. Th ••• undetermined Ideas tb6s have Ita mare potential 
being, a being !!! tut~," which keep. them from being "utter 
nothingness.,,9S The Platonic world, or so it seema to the 
present writer, turne out to be analogous to the 1homistic 
absolute order In which all e ••• nee. exlst ab.olyed trom the 
conditions ot .1ngularlty and univerSality.96 
94 cP, 6.192. 
-
95 CPt 1.218. Pelrce 1s not m.~l,. reduclng the •• 
undetermined tou to the stat. ot ph.lve potency. tor he aa,._ 
that th1. potential be1ns the,- have "would ttot be the utter 
nothlngn ••• which would befall matter (or spIrit) it it were 
to be depr1ved ot the governance ot Ide... • • • For matter 
WOuld thus not only not aotually exlat, but 1 t would hot have 
even a potentIal existence, since potentlality is an affair ot 
ideaa. It would be Just downright Iothlng. fl (Ibid.) The:re.rore 
the interpretation gIven In the text ot the thee!' ... ma lIcit. 
96 See, tor instan •• , St. ?boa_ Aquina., De Ente 
fat Dlent!., In.2.. ThomuAsulnatla 22uacula 9D'.nla neiiio~.ra J!~§j: ·~;l:::~·!n~:;!!:rrie~·id~a:a:~:tdl!:~'b~S~lV!!::lSl-
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... Another talling common to theories ot reallsm whloh 
1s eliminated by Peirce Is that the generals exiat In the same 
~ay that indIvIdual tacta do. He i8 not one at thoae re-+lat. 
'Who belIeve, tor instanoe, that the ,..,.. of gravitation exists 
"1n nature" precisel,. in the a.ame way as particular talling 
bodies exl.t. 97 Peirce'. distinction between secondnesa and 
Tbirdnes8 prevents thia hlPostaa1s ot generals, tor, as haa 
been shown, existence 1s. ll:m.1ted to 1ndividual tacts by Second-
ness, and cannot properl,. be predicated ot generals. A "al.lat 
need not mainta1n the existanc. ot generals} he need only uphold 
their, re&llty.98 That is, Peirce concelves ot existence as a 
special mod.e of reality, Just a8 rellll ty In Its turn ia a special 
mode ot being. Just as there can be being with no complete real-
ity (on, tor instance, Prot.gor .. ' assumption that man ia t~. 
measure ot all thIngs), so there can be reality wIthout exist-
ence, tor existence Is an absolutely determinate torm. ot real-
ItJ.99 Peirce admit' that generals are real, ~t he doea not 
in themselv.s (thus avoiding Platonism), and ,.et the,. are not 
determ1ned to a particular being. They could theretore be tbe 
nature accord1ng to its absolute considerat1on, nei~er par-
t1cular nor univereal. 
97 CP, l.27n. 
-
98 Peirce quite otten thus distinguiSh •• existence 
and real1 ty, the latter ot which has the wider extenlton. For 
instance, In OP, 6.)49, he ea,.e: "I call your attent10n to the 
tact that reaIIt, and existence are t...o ditfer~nt things." 
See &110 CP, ,.cr. . 
-
., 
to accord to them the same absolutely determinate exi8t • 
• nce which belongs to 1ndividuals as .uch. 
:rhus doe 8 Peirce avoid .eveX'al ot the more common 
.:r!'ors made by proponents ot realism in the past. The next 
,tep must be to explain what he himaelf held on the un1ver8al-
1~, or the generality as he preterred to call It,lOO ot real 
things. The problem to bo aolved now 1s to ascertain the pre-
~18. character ot the "samething" ~Ich all mambers ot a ola •• 
ba.e in common, and how it 18 related to the conoX'ete indivIdual 
on the one hand and to the abstX'act un1versal concept on the 
other. 
Peirce'. doctr1ne •• em. to evolve along the tollow1ng 
lines. Only 8ingular things exist apart from thought. 10l But 
the nature, or the intelligible content, "i_ the very _.-
nature ~lch in the mind is unIversal and in re 18 singular."lOI 
--
Or, to •• up. 
The truth 18, thererore, that that real nature whlch 
exists 1n re, apart trom all action ot the intelleot, 
though 1ii 1l'selt, apUt' tl"ODl it. relationa, 1t be 
.Ingular, yet is actually universal as it exist. in 
100 "lb.is word [un1versa11 waa used in the MIddle Ages 
Where we ahould now use the word General. • • • 'When the Schola •• 
tic. talk ot universal., they merely mean general term •• " 
(CP, 2.)67.) 
-
101 £!, 6.49$. Fra.e~ts ~erkele%, 4$9. 
102 Fras.r t , Berkelel, 4$9. 
relation to the mind. 10) 
• tail" objeotion to the U8e ot this last passage would be to say 
that peiroe ls only summarizing scotus' position here, and not 
.tating hi. own opinion. That m1ght be true it the same thought 
vere not to reour again in Pelrce t s wrIt1ngs, but the continual 
outcropping ot this idea torcea. one to ascribe it to Peirce 
himself. In an imag1nary dIalogue between a pragmatlcist and. 
hi. opponent, Peirce adopts as his opinIon the doctrine of the 
great doctors of the past, who did not belie.e that general. I, 
.xisted, "but regarded generals aa mod •• ot determination ot 
individuals, and such mod •• were recognised .. being ot the 
na~e ot thought."104 The question i ••• ttled in the same 
tenor, but more conclusively, in this paaaaget 
'lheJ.'te is no man Of whom. all turther determtnation can 
be denied, yet there 18 a man, abstraction being made 
ot all further determinatlon. There is a real d1rter-
ence between man irrespectlve of what the other deter-
minations may be, an! man with this 01'" that partioular 
seri.s of determinations, although undoubtedly thia lO~ 
dittel"'ence 18 only relative to the mind and not.!!! .!.!.. 
!he "man l~sp.ctlv. of what the other deteminatlons IU7 be" 
1s the nature aa 1t exists in ~elation to the mind, while the 
"man wi th this or that particular •• rl •• of determinations" 
1. the exlstlng .ingular object. 
-
10) Ibid., 459-460. 
104 CP, 5.50]. 
-
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pe~rce hasteos to an.wer an objection that suoh a 
"i'w ot the universal. d •• troy. ita reality because it makes it 
4.pend on a relation to thought. The belief that the ream must 
b' independent of reflective aotlvlty, or be a thing In itselt, 
1. tal.e. The not10n ot a thing in itself, e'xaggc-ated "in the 
~ual philosopher faablon," l.a~s to a self-contradiction, tor 
it it 1s an obJeot ot thought, it cannot be at the same, time 
wholly outside the pale. of the mind,106 tor a man cannot have 
any conoeption of an incognizable reali ty.107 Indeed, it 1. 
quite plain that fta realist is simply one who knows no molte 
pecondite It.alit, than tbat whlch i. P8preaented in a true 
pepreaentation. Slnoe, theretore, tne word 'man' 1. true or 
,omething, that which 'man t means i8 1"8.1.,,108 It ls the nomi. 
nalist who runs into diffioultl •• her~tor he maintains that 
there i8 an unknowable something which allows you to predioate 
man of all ita interiors, while the realist .tapIr state. that 
-man" i8 a universal naturte 1b ioh can theretoH be applied to 
the interiors because of an identical 1ntellig1ble content. 
But this Simple analys18, 80 close to the doctrine 
tbliliar to soholaa tics, w1ll not sutfice tor an adequate treat-
ment ot Peirc.an realism. While it i. true that the tundamen-
106 CP, $.$25. 
-
107 CP, 
-
$.312. 
108 • 
I'll 
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tal. ot his "'system have now been traced, thet>e 1et remain 
,everal quite interesting elaborations on tn1s ba.ic tneorr 
~lch deserve to be noticed. IE the treatment given to the •• 
additional pOints i8 not conclusive or .at1atying in the pre-
,ent oontext, an attempt vill be made later in the thesis to 
Jbow their rull import in relation to other tactors to be 
introduced in aubsequent chaptera. 
The first tact to be noted, and One ot capltal 1m-
portance in Peirc.' •• yst.m ot universals, is the striking 
41tterence 1n the tundamentam in re Which 1s the ba.ia ot the 
p --.....-
tor.mal universal tor Peirce, and tor Scotus and the other eohol-
•• tles. Tbat intrinsic "aomething" 1n each being WhiCh allows 
a univeraal to be predlcated ot 1t 18, tor Aristotle and the 
.chol.atica, the substantial tor.m or nature ot the being by 
Wh1ch the being ls and by whloh it i8 thls being.1OSa 'elrce 
doea not get his generalltytrom this source} rather the ele. 
ment in a being Which aerves as the baaia tot" generall ty ls .. 
hablt ot actlon, not yet rull, d.te~ined, but tendlng towarda 
tulllJr and tuller determination a. the habit becomes mer e lUlI-
veraa!. (f.bat is, a8 ltapplie. to more and more sl~.tion •• ) 
-
lOS. St. Thom ... , tor instance, says: wEt 1deo relln. 
~ltur qUOd ratio generia vel apecie1 oonvenlat .ssentia. secun-
dum quod 81gnltlcatur per modua totlua, ut nomine hominia vel 
an1malla, prout impllcit. et indlstincte contlnet totum quod in 
1ndlvlduo est." De EDt. et Essentia, Chap. III, ed. Perrier, 
I, 35. ---
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tbe roots of thl. tneorJ lie in pelrce's adaptation ot evolu-
tiona%,}" ide.s trom Darwinlsm in his principle of chance, in 
h1s theory ot pragmaticism whlch hold s that meaning ls all the 
possible result. ot an ide.,and in his teachlng, borrowed 110re 
trom Lamarck than tram Darwin, on m.ind .s • babl t-taklng raoul-
$1.109 To explain all ot the.~ tully would take a good-s1zed 
book, but in. short space their influence on generality can ,at 
least be pOinted out summarily_ 
Hepe 18 how D&I'winism militate. against the Aristo-
telian theory ot tlxedllO torml, ~r "universals infrangibly 
.stablished for onee and all in the beginning 01" time, unadap-
t1ve and unalterable torever."lll Since evolution presumes 
that new species are oontinuall,. ooming into existence, the 
members ot theae new species must be related to ona another 
by a universal not hitherto had in nature. But since the very 
109 See CP, 6.15-17, tor .. summ.ary ot the varloua 
theories ot evolution. Also 6.)00 tor Lamarck. 
110 It ma,. be that the connotation of "tixed" torm 
led Peirce to look elsewhere tor the toundation tor h1s uni-
versal in things. It "'lxed" 18 interpreted .a "atatio," 
then there would be no room tor development or change In torm.. 
But it a "fixed" tom can at the aame time be a natura, or 
Ir1ncialua operationi., as it is tor Aristotle and Ene schol-
astIcs, tEen ~he very te1801087 ot tne operatIon ota being 
would pOint to 1ts development. 
111 Fe1bleman, Introduetlon~ ?eircats Ph1losophll 
.. 
~de of being ot Aristotle's torms is ~!!, a transition t~o.m 
one to another become. lmpossible almost by def1nitlon. Sino., 
tnerefore, Darwinian evolut10nl12 ,eemed to make the dootrine 
ot forma as tixed, unohangeable entities untenable, pelrce 
looked afield tor a theoPy that would allow his teaching on the 
reallty ot general. to tit the proorustean bed ot no atablel1) 
torma wlthout undergolng such change. a. to render unlversal. 
unreal. He found such a theory in the principle ot chanoe 
and the teaohing that hab1 t, or law, 18 one ot the predoalnant 
teatures of nature, Whether mind or matter. 
Pelroe, in a paper entitled "T.be DOotrine of Nec ••• it}' 
lX&mined,_l14 attacked rigid ne.e.sltarian1-. and it. consequent 
of flxed torms on several count.. They are principally thes., 
l)1be seneral prevalenoe ot gr-owth, 2) the variety ot the un!-
112 pelx-e., it ie plain, was much impre.sed by the 
work of Darwin.. In 1900 he sald that it was h1s "inestimable 
pr1v11ege to have telt .a a young man the warmth of the stead-
l1y burning enthuaiaam ot the scientific generat10n ot Darwin." 
(Sm1thsonian Institution R.~gl't •• Wa.shington, 1900, 694.) But 
hi never futly .dopEea '~. heory.a 811eh, although elem.-nta 
of 1 t oontinued to 1nfluence b1Jl 1n othel' lin •• ot thought. 
113 Once again 1t ia pointed out that Pei:roe .eema 
to have identitied the notions of • fixed, or .table, torm and 
ot a atatio torm. Not wanting the latter, he alao rejeoted 
th. tormer, and thereto:re had to seek another toundation tor 
hi. generals, Scholaatl~ hovever, 8"y that the torm is tixe4, 
and theretore have an intl'1nsic baaia tor univeraalit.T, vhI1e 
the tom as a nature •• rv •• alao a. the :tr inoipl. ot opel'ation 
and devel.paeni ot the being. 
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•• rse, whlch~ .prings tram chance, and 1. manit.atly inexplicable, 
and. 3) the existence ot law, which requires to be explain.d, and 
lIke everything el •• whioh 1s to be explained, muat be explalne4 
b1 8om.thing else, that la, by non"law or real chance. Peirce, 
tone.iving matter 8ameWhat .. the anclents, held that the Whole 
world has evolved to 1ts present state through lawa which have 
developed trom the ellaot1cma.. that exi.ted 1n the beginning, 
and 1s progre.sing to even further determination and pertee. 
tion. But ~at Is it that explaine wh;r this .peele. should 
arls. rather than that? It 1,. chance. W1 thout chance thing. 
would be determined to one, and nothing new would ever come 
into existence. Yet chance, on the other hand, 1. a180 the 
root ot 18 •• 115 For once an event has occurred by chance, III 
habit ot ·.ome sort 18 .et up in the matter whioh makes tne 
.ame event more likel,. to happen agaln than ita opposite. Yet 
.nat ls law it not a rule, or habIt, aa;ring that thi. given 
.vent will happen rather than that in the.e oircUlI1Stanoe.? So 
law, which was ••• n to be one manite.tation ot Thlrdne •• , 
'.uses the particular existents charaettrlaed by Fir.tn ••• and 
Secondne •• to contorm to an indef1nite future. Thus, aJ. though 
not existing in the realm of t.ct~ Thirdn •• s a. law may be .ald 
to govern that realm, s1nce future event. of Firstne.s and Sec-
Gndnes8 will conform to 1t. But even law it.elt 1. not tull,. 
-
• 
... 
4.t.mined (thus again there is no tixed ".torm" to aerve .s 
th- balls tor generality), tor It law were rIgidly carried out 
tttl,l babi ts would at once become 10 fixed as to give room tor 
110 turther formation ot habIts. ,.116 
, 
This last phrase can be better elucidated by con-
ddering a twotold meaningot h1lbit. HabIt can be a form, or 
principle ot operation, as a habit of alamgiving tlows from a 
torm in the IndIvidual. Or again habit may be considered as 
law, the wayan operation takes place under given circumstances. 
In Peirce's Collected Pm,ers it is very dIfficult to find defi-
nite references to habit as fo~, acoidental or substantial, 
,.peciall,. in the sixth volume whioh treats of the matter ex-
tensi vel,.. Therefore peIrce looked upon habit almost exclu-
lively as law, which give. the key to the root weakness in his 
theory ot universals. Peirce neVer goes on to ask what there 
18 in the thing which i8 the principle ot the law. ae has the 
-
operation, but the prinoiple 01" the operatIon i8 laeking. This 
haa been alrea~ noted above in connection wIth the representa. 
ti Te tunc ttem ot '!'hir4n •••• 
But ha. Pelrce, In aestroying all fl.ed torms and 
hablta, cut himselt ott trom a rea11stlc explanation ot unI-
versals? Peiro. thought not. Fort at though he had no form 
1ntrInaio to the thing to .erve as a baai. for univevaali ty. 
-
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• did retaln~th. principle pointed out above in the .ection 
c Thirdneas, namely, that general. are 1 ... 8, tw Thirdne •• ia 
,. meana ot predioting 'What w11l generally happen. Prom this 
,rem1• e Peirce 4educed-or it will be deduced tor him here-
~. following s7110 g1 .. , 
Generals are lawl, 
Ci law. are relations (not tC»n'l') • 
• : general. are rel.a tiona (not torma). 
r,r.ne truth of the minor proposition ia maniteat trom 'What haa 
just been sald on the preceding page about habIt aa e~ulval.nt 
to law, and not to form. B7 law, in other worda, Peiroe does 
Inot mean the form lx-om whloh the hahi t flowS, but the ]a w aa 
~avlng a reaction on other eventa. And onCe he had settled 
upon a relation rather than a tom as the tundamentWll in N P1 ............. 
(or should It be Int~t .!:!!,) tor universalit7, hi. next move 
was obvious. B7 introduoing a logio ot relatIve. he believed 
that he could retain his claim to the tItle ot realist. "The 
great ditterenoe," he explain., "between the logio ot relative. 
and ordinary logiC i. that the t~er regards the torm of rela-
tion in, all its generalit,. and in its difterent possible .pee1 •• 
16111. the latter 1s tied down to the matter or the single speolal 
relation ot similarity_"117 ~us ordinary logiC haa much to 
do with genera and $peel •• , or sets ot objects "compriSing all 
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tbat stand to one another in a speoial relation ot similaritYI~ 
whereas the logic of relative. goes further, and reters to 
.ystems whIch are ,ets ot obJeots "comprising aD.ljhat stand to 
one another in a group ot connected relatlons. ttl19 The mod. ot 
reasoning tor the ~o logics varies, tor 
Induotion according to ord1narr logiC rl.e. tram the 
contemplation of a sample ot a 01as8 to that ot the 
¥.hole 01a.8, but accordlng to the 10glc ot relatIve. 
it riaes from the contemplatIon ot a fragment of a 
system to the envlsagement ot the complete ayatem. l20 
What is the loglcal consequenoe ot this new logio? 
The old ide .. ot univ.r.al as un~ "Et~ suod p .. edloari pot.at 
!! plurlbu. oan be retained, but 1n a new settIng. No longer 
18 1 tone torm. which oan be toUl.ld in man,. 1nd! vidual., tor the 
torm Is not tixed, but ever_changlng.121 1be .ame law, or 
habIt, however, can apply to the same set ot objects, tor, even 
though they are changing (or at leaat becoming more and more 
determined with the passage of time), atl11 the .ame relation 
between them oontinue. to hold true. 1h18 re1atlonlsm, to use 
Abbot' 8 word, 1s found also in Peirce" theo17 ot pragmatici •• 
Where the being ot the concept and truth doe. not eon.i.t in a 
118 Ibid. 
-
119 lbid. 
120 Ibid. 
121 It hard17 need be repeated that pe1rce haa not 
yet found 8 pr1nc!ple tor the operat ion of the hab! t aa long .a 
he deni •• a form in the balna. 
S7 
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,tatic unit" but in the1r relation to other eventa. For 
instance, the 
cone~tlon, that Is, the rational purport ot a word 
or other exp:Nt •• lon, 11e. exclu.lvely in its coneelv-
able bearing upon the conduct or lIte, 80 that,.lnce 
obviously nothing that might not result from experi-
ment can have all1' direct bearing upon conduct, if one 
can define accuratel,. all the conceivable experimental 
phenomena Which the affirmation or denial ot a concept 
could imply, one '1111 have therein a oomplete defini-
tion ot thel~~ncept, and there !! abeolu tell nothlns 
more 1n it • 
....... -...-. --
s1a1lar17t 
The opinion Which is fated to be ultimately agreed 
to by all who Investigate is what ve mean by the 
truth, and t~!~object represented in this opinion 
is the real. ~ 
Truth, then, i8 what everyone Will agree upon, tor, aa Pe1rce 
el.e~ere remarks, it there are no dl •• enters fro.. an opinion, 
then that $pinion can be accepted aa ~. (e.pec1ally it tne 
trith i8 arrived at through experimentation, tor then there 
wl1l have been other truitle.s experiments which did not 4ive 
the l"eaul ta cOntained in the one truth tlnal11 al-riYed at, and 
henee were discarded.) 
One ma7 vonder how the mind could be satisfied with 
accepting truth or universality a8 mere11 a relation between 
things, and not wanting to pIn it down to a single determined 
122 CP, S.412. 
-
123 CPt 5.407. 
-
,8 
detirition o~e ••• nc. Which It oan und.~stand. PeI~oe would an-
.wer thil obJeotion by saying that it i8 the .ery nature or 
the mind to be always looking tor the turther determinations 
ot things, and he would demonstrate his oontention by an appli-
cation ot the principle ot continuity. Ju. t u the event which 
ti~st took plaoe by chance in •• tter becomes a habit and thua 
oan be predioted by mean. ot a law, 80 the mind also becom.s 
aooustomed to .eeing things happen in a certain order, and an 
aS8ooiation ot ideal 18 built up whiGh permitl the mind to 
formulate a general law.124 
'lhus m1nd and mat tar are governed by the same habi t, 
and as hab1 ts and laws in matte%" move to%"W&rd to slteater and 
lreater determination, mind moves alons with them 2ar1 2aaau. 
"'lhe e •• enca ot fleason is auch that ita being never oan have 
been oomp18 tel., pertected. It always muat be in a .tata ot tn-
oipiency. ot growth. It 1a 11k. the oharaoter ot a man ¥hich 
consiats in the Idea8 that he wl11 conceive and in tha etforts 
124 Palroe attempt. to tree himselt trom the charge ot 
materiali~, bowever, by atating that mInd i. not governed by 
mechanical law, but rather that the "one orIginal law [1sJ the 
recognued law ot mind, the law ot aaaooiation, ot whlch the law. 
of matter are regarded .a mere special .eaults." (CP, 6.277) 
01' agalnt "Hatter would be nothing but mind tha t nad such In-
dUl'ated habits as to cause It to act with a p".u11arlr high 
~.gree ot mechanioal regularit1. or routine." (Ibid.) 
It is alaoworthwhile to mention here ~th1rd prin-
~ipl. in Peirce along with chanca and habit-taking which ex-
~laln8 the existence ot law in the universe, namel,., love, or 
.aso~tion. Tbrough this association, as mentioned in the text, 
~e mind i. able to torm a law correlating similar event •• 
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that he w1l1'" make, and which only develops aa the occasions 
.ctuallyariae. n125 
That, in briet, 1a a picture ot Peiree'a realism. He 
does have real objects, thua rejecting idealism. And he bolda 
• common nature wh1ch 1. 8ing'llar in the individual things, but 
universal. in 1ta relation to the mind. Yet this eommon nature 
1. not a tixed Ar1atot_llan torm (not something real11 intrinsio 
to the being, tor Pe1rce a.w an intrinaio torm a8 only a .tatic 
~orm), but something ever developing along Darwin1an l1ne •• 
aut the new log1c ot relative •• an atill tind universality in 
~ompa:r1ng a fragment ot a .,..tem, ohallging though it be, to 
the whole system. The mind, moreover, i. satistied with this 
~ecause it is a habit-taking faculty, and ~. aa true that 
iNhich is prelented to it moat frequentl,._ With thi. sketoh of 
Peirce'. realism completed, it i. time f1na111 to examine some 
pf 1ts sourcea. 
125 CP , 1.615. 
-
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ORAl!ER III 
SOURCES OF PEIRCE'S REALISM 
Although the reader may b. anxious to s .. where 
peirce'. theory ot realls. wUl. lead him, he must restraln hi. 
tnter •• t while an outllne 1s aketched deplcting the baOkground 
in Which Peirce vorked. To understand and evaluate hls system 
fully; acoount must be taken ot h1s knowledge ot Duns Scotus 
and Franci. Ellingwood Abbot, and the influenoe they had on 
him. With a clear understanding ot th ••• source., It will be 
easler to detect and .eparate various lactors 1n relrce'. own 
lySte.m. ~. reali .. ot Scotu. will be treated in the first part 
of thi. chapter, followed 0'7 a scrutiny of Abbot" theo!7. 1ben 
in the next chapter P.irce-a use of the ••• ouroe. will be inv ••• 
tlgated. 
In his dIM tl'lne of universals, !:Juna sootua large17 
tollowed the theo17 of his time, whioh St. Thomas too had ac-
.apted. Universals exiat 1n three wIJ's l~ l?etore thing., 
a. 1de.a in the mind ot God, 2) !! thing., .a their •••• no.J 
and 3) ~ tel' things, •• abatract Clonoepta in the .1nds ot men. l 
• 
-
1 Beranard Ge7er, Friedrloh ueberve,s qrundrl.~ ~ 
60 
61 
... 
setting _ide the ti!'st type ot unive,..al. which i. usuallY' 
oalled un1.e!'a.l., in "aulando, the pr1ma1"1 aim of the •• pege. 
will be to establiSh the relationship between the universal 
nature as 1 t exlsts In things and that aame na tUN as the mind 
knOWs 1t. 
The tirst pOint to be. taken up Is the relation ot the 
tormalitle. in the thIngs to the concepts ot them in the mind. 
A too rapid appraisal of Seotua' doctrine here leada manJ to 
imPute to him an exaggerated real1_. It mal be that thl. 
charge 1s true, for Scotus certainly leave. htmaelt more open 
to tne aocu •• tion than most ot the other aehol.atic., however, 
hI. dootrine will be given here with no judgment as to whether 1i 
verge. too tar toward the reitieatien ot univeraals or not. 
What, then, are the formaliti •• ? ~.l are not, firat 
of all, the note. in a hhing Which oOPreapond to the concepta 
had in the mind. 1hia position would ineluctably lead into an 
exaggerated realism. Th.Y' are, ratner, distinct realiti •• in 
a thing, to eaoh ot which correspond. a dIstinct concept. The •• 
entitie., or realities, do not exist apart or .eparately from 
One another, but there does exist in reality a certain distino-
tion between them to which the distinction between their ooncepta 
tn the mind answera. Thus, acoording to the tormal distinctlon, 
telcb10hte del' Phll0SO~1.~ II. Die 'atrlatlaohe und Sohol .. -
.. I8clie phI'lOiOpSre, 12 e4., Baser, X9'St. Jlz. -
-... 
a being will lPOS ••••• a mAnJ tormal diatinctions .a the intel-
leot oan tor.m dlstinot ooncepta about that be1ng. sootus doe. 
not go tNnt the intellect to the thing, but in the thing there 
----are objects whioh must be grasped bJ such divers. oonoepts.! 
T.bus the tor.mal distinction 1s a real distInction. 
-
that Is, in rea11ty the tormal distinotion precede. all acts ot 
the intellect. It 1. not, however, a distinotion between thing. 
which exist apart trOlll qne _other, but simply atatea that on. 
formality is not another formality, or that there 18 no to!'!!!A 
ldentl!l; pl'e.ent. In taot, Sectus would rather speak of a 
formal non-ldentltJ than ot a to~al distinction.) Thus, be. 
cause 1n a being the tormal. note of r-atlonali tr doe. not Inelud. 
the tormal note of an1malli7 or corpol'eit." there 1. in thia 
being a tonual l1on.ldentlt'J, or dlstlnction, preoi.e17 because 
of the lack of formal identity. TheNtore Sootus can hold that 
hi. universals are not produots of the intellect applled to tbe 
2 "Non ,uod ratl0 acclplatur pro dttterentla tormata 
ab Intellectu. sed ut patio acoipltur pro qulddltate ~.1 aeoun-
dum quod ,ulddltaa e.t oblectum lntellectua. u o~ua Oxonien.e, 
I, d. 2, q. 7, n. 4), Vi ••• ed., paris, 1891-18,=, VIII, 60li. 
The author ot thi. the.i. haa been fortunate In having 
at hi. disposal a r!2ortatio ot a CO~8. on Tbe Human Soul 1n 
John nuns Sootua gIven. Sf 'rotesaor Etienne Gllson at the Pon-
tifioal. InstItute of Medl.eval StudI •• 1n ToZ"onto, Oct(),ber-
December, 1950. Lecture. ~.e to Eleven were •• pecially helpful. 
!he re!!l'tat~o was taken b7 Michael M. Montague, S.J. 
3 uMeliu8 eat utI iata negattv., hoob_on eat torma-
11ter- idem, quam hoo .st 810 et a1c dIatlnctum. Ibid, n. 44. 
603b. 
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outslde world, but are found in things by the I11nd.4 
~ tit yet pemalna to be ••• n in what pel. tlon the 
unlver.al stand, to the mind and to thlng.. For Scotus "unI-
,.ersal" means two things. . subjectIvely It 18 the notIon pro-
dUced by- the m1nd, the second Intentlon whlch exists only in 
the intellect. objectively it stands to%' the absolute essence 
or the thing conaidered in ita universal aspects. This qulddlty-
or 1tsolt 1a neither univer.al nor singular, but indifferent, 
and o~atltutee the direot objeot or the Intellect. S scotus 1. 
at great paina to ateer the middle course between extreme reall_ 
4 "univerealla non sunt fictione. Intellectua, tunc 
enim nunquam 1n quid pl"aedloaren'bur de re extra, nee ad i8tlnl-
tlone. pert1nerent, nee Metaphysic. dltre1'ret a Loglca, imo 
omnia 8clentl. easet Logio., quia de universall." fobeoram.ta 
subt1l1a81ma, IV, Vlv •• ed., V, 1". I 
m. authenaicit,. ot the'l'heore .. ta haa been the matter 
of much dispute. Wadding and the b!fier 8 • .1'17 Scoti.ts consid-
ered it authentlc. Lonur' and other modems have held the 
opposing vlew. 1he latest trend, however. seems to be toward 
regarding it .s possibly auth.ntl~, and this i. the vi.w of 
BaudPJ'. Balle, BOehner, and finall,. Gllson, who argues t:rom the 
internal evidenoe ot the seneral agreement in doctrine of the 
Theoremat. with the rest of sootus- genuine ~lt1ng.. At an7 
rat.; It use ls ~ad. ot it onl7 to state in clearer terms what 
other p.s.age. hint at, Scotu.' doctrine w111 not be mutilated 
by the U.. ot the work, even though 1 t should prove to be .put-l-
ou •• 
5 "Universal. aoclpltur allquando p~ intentlone 
•• cunda, quae Mqultur operatloneD! pr1mam intellectua, qua In-
tel11g1tur quldditu absolute. • • • Allq,uando autem un1versale 
acclpltur pro re 8ubjecta intention! .ecundae, id .at pro quid-
dltate rel absolute, quae quantum est de •• , nee eat un!verlalla, 
nee singular1., •• d de •• eat Inditter.n., et tale eat obJectwa 
Intellectua d1rectum. w 9ua.at~one8 '!!irLl~ro~ Art.totelia !! 
Anima, XVII, n. 14, Vive. ;a., If!. ~ a-b. 
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and nOminaliam, and thus to sateguard the realit,' of the indi-
.1dual without jeopardizing the objective valldit,y of the un!-
.ersal. !heretore he devotes long pa.aage. to a minute ex-
planatlon of the relation between the universal in the thing 
and the univeraal in the mind. R. wiah •• to com.bine logical 
oonceptualism w1th metaph7s1cal real1sm w1thout a hypostatlzatlon 
ot the conoept. 
'lb. actuall,. ex18ting thing ia the 1ndivldual. Dif-
rerent indIvidual. ot the aame speo1es ahare a common nature, 
but that nature 18 not of It.elt common, tor It does not ex1st 
1n the indlvidual sub patione o!J!!!P!?:i!. The oomm.un1t,' 1. path.r 
• mode which belongs to the nature only 1n80rar .a ! t 1. oon-
oeived .s common Or universal by the mind. 6 Logically, however, 
1t is prior to both th ••• condItions and, regaPded in the light 
or th1. prior1t7, 1t is the easenoe .. ~ ,u;~.!.!1. the meta-
phy.ical -what," Whioh i8 ier .!! the object ot the inteUect. 7 
•• 
6 "Diol poteat, quod ratio oommunis, vel ~pposltl, 
non attrlbuitur 81, ut ,salatlt, •• d ut oonolp1tur ap~ lnt.I-
lectuna •••• Ie;ltuJ' oomaune .ecundum quod habet ratlone. ooa-
.unl., eat natura, prout concepta .ub ratione 4lcibl118 4. plu-
1'1bu •• " suaeatlonea 1n LlbJ"oa Per1hermenlaa. I, q. 1. n. 4, 
Vlve. e4., I, 55t"'5~2:- I . 
7 -Quallter aute. poteat hoc lntell1g1, poteet ali. 
Clual1ter vidept per dictUlll Av14ennae S Metee. ubl vult quod 
minlt.S .• ,t tant\uJl lhutn1taa, neo ex •• una,' nee elure., nec 
_ versitla nec eart1e.".r.. In£.l.I!,'i; i'On ear.x •• una;-
un!tate. • .-.0 mo(l6 quo illquid •• t universale taotum. .b !n-
tell_ow, non ut obj_ctua Intellectua, ne. eat particularla •• 
•• , lloet enlm nunquam a1t real1ter sine allquQ 1stol'Wll, non 
tamen eat de •• aliquod IatoPUa, •• d ,.t prIus naturalltep am-
6$ 
... AS an absolute quIddIty, then, it exist. IndItt.~ent17 1n the 
objective world of thIngs, neIther singular nop universal. 
aut this 1. not the tull picturel the common nature even in 
its relation to the mind 18 originally indifterent to repre-
senting the .... n_a .... tu .;.;;;;o..ra ... ja '!,!J universali t,. 1s .. tupther logical 
de terminat ion. to!' a1 though the quidd.l t:r is known as un! vereal, 
univettsali ty does not enter into the metaph,.alcal concept of 
the natUH 1.8 auch, but is .. logical addition. 8 !heretore the 
universal exist. a. actually univeraa.ll.ed only in the mind, 
insofar.a it ia predicable ot many individuals.' Despite thIs, 
however, one must not imagine that 1 ts un! ty i8 purely subjec-
t!ve, tor in virtue of ita existenee 1n re a. a nature it poa-
--
ae ... s an objective unit,- of 1ts ovn, qulte apart trom the sub-
nibu. tstta. Et secundum iatam prlorltatem natur.alem est sao~ 
qU~! !!!. et per a. objeotum intellectus. tt ORus o~ •• , II, ., 
q. , •• 7, Viv ••• d., XII, 48a-b. 
8 "Non .olus autem ip.a natura eat d. •• inditt.rena 
ad ease in Int.l1.ctu, et In partlculari, ac per hoe ad ., •• 
universale at singular., •• d et ipsa hahan •••• e in intellectu, 
non habet pr1Dto ex: se univers.litatem; llcet-rnIm Ipsa intel-
11gatur sub ~lver.alltate, ut sub modo tnt.llisend! ipl", 
tamen unlversallt •• non est pers' conceptus ejus prbd, quia non 
cone.ptua fifetaphy.lci .ed Logiei. Logiou •• nim eonaiderat ae-
cund .. intentione. applioataa prlm1 •• " Ibid., 46b. 
9 "Dleo quod universal. in aotu non est n1sl in in-
tellectu, quia non .at aotu. univareal., ni8l ,i t unum in multi. 
et de mult18, ita quod de multi. eat &ptitudo px-oxima unlve:ra-
_alia in aotu, quia non poteat haber! in aetu univ.rsal., qUOt: 
Ipsum .at diclbl1e de all0 ••• n1ai per Intellectum." fteEo:rta~~ 
Parisienala. II, d. 2, q. ,. n. 12. 
• 
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.dtiv. unity ot the concept, a unity which i8 neither numerical 
or merely conceptual, but a specific unity, and which, al though 
•• 8 than a numerical unitJ, is yet none the le8S r.al. 10 
Wh7 is the unity of the common nature a numerical 
anit,. whioh 1s less than real' Precisely because the onl,. 
~ing that can have real unity t. the Singular existing mattWiJl 
)bjeet. The common nature, Which i. really I)nly a stack ot uni-
versal to~alities, 1s indifferent to singularit7 or universality, 
lnd ean be tied down to a singular thing onl,. by haeccel ~.s. 
~atf though, 18 the nature ot this haeeeetty, and why doe. 
~cotus mak0 it an lntegral part of his system? First of aU, 
Scotus needs hascoeity to sateguard the unity ot being. On. 
",.y have wondered what has happened to the uni ty ot being tOJ! 
scotus, slnoe there are -variOUS different formaliti •• present 
in the same being. To st. Thomas such a situation is unthink-
able, tor a being can hav. only one substantial torm. E •• 
-
is the aetu~ 8ssendi which make. a thing exist ~1!21ioiter. 
In scotus the caS8 1. dlfterent. the •••• Whieh belongs to 
-
10 rtDloo ad ~ ••• tione. cone8dando. • • quod .at 
unita. ext~a an1mam minor quam numeral!., ut $I).cU1ea •••• 
Cn. 12] Tam.en lata uni taa reall. medla inter I1l.\11l4tralem et rat!-
oni~! non eat d1rterentia un1versalltati" quia hoc est actu 
dlc1a11e de multi., .ed .olum .st indlfferent!a, secundum ~am 
non repugn.at sibl ease hoc at hoe .1mul, taman non poteat •• cun-
dum. i.tam reale. un1tat._inopem 8S8e a1mul hoc et hoo,. nisl 
1n conceptu in intellectu, ,uOd non est ex parte sul, quia equl-
nitaa est tantu. equlnlta.. tbld., n. 11-12. 
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each •••• nce i8 the !!!! •••• n~i .. J being exiat, onl7 through 
the e88e ~xsi.t.nti~, which OODles to 1t through the torm by 
tch the whole is !!s.!!l!, that 18, a singular being completel,. 
defined in the order of quiddity. Haeccelty 1s this ultimate 
actualIty ot the form. 
The nature ot haeceeity can be outlined brierly, it 
at be a positive entitYJ 1t must not be 1n the common nature; 
and it must be able to enter into com.position with the common 
natuH. It oannot be nega"t1ve, tor then it would be nothing, 
and the tnt_tor would not difter troll the eoDlllOtJ. natttre. It 
must be .o_thing outside the common nature, tor the oommon 
natutte ot i tselt can be found in many things, and that by which 
an individual 1. an indIvidual must be perfectly Ind1vidual for 
each single being. 1'h1. posl tive entlt7, ""17. must be able 
to enter into 00.,08it10n td th the common nature 1n order to 
fON a being Whioh 18 an !!!!!!! 2.~ s~ .. 
One must not get a oontu.ed not10n ot ha.coeity, hov-
eTer, and imagine that it 1. the laat or the torm. which con-
st! tu te a being. Thl. perilap. would be the loglcal outg:rowth 
of scotua' system or .ssentlallst meta~hl.ic8 Where the entire 
emphaal. 18 placed on the 11ne ot quiddlty, but it is not wba t 
ScotU8 wishe.. Haeeeett,. 1. that by which are. e.t haec. The 
---
!.!! ls all'ead7 tull,. oon.tltuted 1n the line ot CluIddlt, through 
ita torma ot corporel ty, an1mality, rationality, etc., and need. 
onlZ the l •• t "tom" or h.e.celt,. to determine it to a particular 
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1,ndlvldual, "'just .a 1'1ltlonallt'1 determlnes the genus to a 
.pec.!... But the parallel 1a not pertect. '!'he oommon nature of 
ratIonal an1mal, along with all the other torma it has, 1. al-
ready tullr constituted 1n the line ot essence. It doe. not 
ne.d another torm to give 1t indIvidual exlstene •• 11 H •• ee.1tl, 
theretore, 18 not. torm, but the ultima realltaa formae, or the 
ultima actualitaa to~e.t! Dr. Minge.1) explalns It in th1 • 
....................... --.......-.................. _, ........................... 
11 What the .... nc. n.eds to be lndividuated, ot 
course, i8 not another determinatIon in the line ot 8ssence, 
but a l1m.1tatlon ot the e.senoe 80 that it oan be multiplied. 
1hi8 to:p st. Thomas .is mater1't !Uantitate slf!;ta. as he point. 
out In ;!b. BOat. de rr!ii., q. • a. 2 and ar, Parma ed., 
XVlt;-l .31~. Ad'aI'tIon ot another torm c.,.never gat sootua 
out ot the oommon nature or out of quasl~univ.rselit7. 800tu. 
thel'eto:re sa18 that thel'a 1s something 1n the quiddit,', wh1ch 
mak •• the th1ng singular, but ,.et i. nora qu1ddlt,._ 
12 In all fin1te beings, the pl'opel'tr ot the posl,lve 
anti ty 'Wh1ch ind.i vidual i... the c:a.u.lddity 1s not ~o add anothel' 
quiddity to the first, but the ettect ot the positive individu-
ating entlt,y i. to posit the whole qulddltatlve entity (genus 
and d1fterence) in a being ot another sort than quiddity'. ThIs 
new oz-der 1s the o:rder ot the singular. "Ista realltas indlvidui 
e8t similia realltatl specifioae, quod eat quasi actus deter-
minan. 11lam r8811t&t8 •• pecle1 quasl po.sibll •• et potentlal •• , 
•• d quoad hoe eliss1mlll., juiiilsta nunluam aumltur a forma addi-
ta, •• d ~a.Ol •• ab ult1m& t-e!t'ate forma.. ~uoaC! "IlIui1 .tl_ 
iit rna Ite, quli It!a reatlE.a specIfloa 00118tl tul t 8~o81-
~, oujua eat pars, 1n ea •• qulddltativo, qula 1psa est entltaa 
quae dam qulddltatlvaJ 1.8ta autem entltaa 1ndlvldul est Pl"1.'It10 dl ... ' 
versa ~ omn1 entltate qulddltat1va, quod Pl"obatUl" ex hoo, quIa 
intelligendo quamcumqae entltat .. quiddltatlvam, loquendo de 
quldd1tatlva entltate l1mitata, non habetu~ in qulddltat~ intel-
lecta, unde Ipsa ait haec, ergo l11a entltaa, tuae de se est 
haec, est alla ent!.s a quidditate vel ab enti tat e quiddltatlva. 
non pote.t ergo conatituere tatum cujus eat para, in es.e quiddl-
tatlvo, .e4 in 8S8e alterlu8 %*Atlonia. ft ~2u, Oxon., II, d. 'f 
q. 6, n. 12, Vive. ed., XII, 135&. (Ital os no~ In origlnal.l 
1.3 par then ius Minges, O.P.Mtt Del" ansebllche enes-
alve Re";llamua ~ Dune Scotu~, 1908, q,o-4?7 · 1 
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'!he ul t1ma real! ta. enti. 1s not the la.at intoming 
• 
prineiple, but tne numerical determination ot the tor.m and 
matter of the composite as ~ torm and thl~ matter. Gl1sonl4 
makes this analoBY" In a poor WilY, haecoei t'yc 18 oomparable to 
a bud in the springtime which is juat ready to burst, the haec-
oei t,. 18 an energy that wants te burst uP. It 1s in the torm and 
yet is not the torm, but a metaphYllcal energ'1 which make. the 
indivIdual to be the individual whioh it la. 
passing b1 the diffioulti •• which thla Scotl.tic 
doctrine engendepa-thi8 the.i. 18 not att •• ptlng to detend 
BCotu., but to give a b~.t r.~ of h1s doctrine on realia~ 
80me of the implioatlons whiCh the emphasia on hae ••• lv., give. 
riae to mal" be considered. In th ... will be found 80m.ot tho •• 
distinoti.e t.ature. of 8eotls. which the other scholastlca 
lacked, and which drew Peirce'8 attention to Duns more than to 
ant othel' figure ot the past, with the p08s1 ble exception of 
Kant, whom, however, ,Peiree followed not .a a d1sc1ple, but .s 
ar .. tl0. On. thing that haeoeeit,. resul ted :In was a decided 
empba8t. on the singular. 81n •• the indtvidual. 18 constltuted 
e~ such through a posttlve entlt7. and not by a more paalive 
prinCiple of individuation aa the Signata _ttel' ot St. Thomaa. 
"Hi. more aOiantl!!c inslatenoe on the eoncrete nature of real. 
ity," according to Hurls, "gives to his thinking a distinctlvel,. 
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1I1odern tUVOUl'. It is not enough for him that the particular 
tIhould be somehow Ob.CUNl,. .en.ed, it i. the pr1taa17 :reality 
and must theretox-e be intelligible Eer u- ,,15 
POI- 'by making the individual. to be such through « 
Pfutltive entlt,', Scotu. once again makes the singular an ob. 
Ject of intuitive cognition. Witbout going into the que.tlon 
ot whetheI- scotns held that there was intultive knowledge ot 
the singular a8 auch .a well as of the exis "tanoe of the .in .... 
gular,16 It can cartainl,. be said that he lald much mON stNsS 
on such knowledge than did st. Thomas. 1h18 can be .. en in hI. 
rejectlon of the luidditaa t!! 8enalbl11s as the natural object 
ot the 1ntel1ect. ne rules this out on many groundst Meta-
ph181call,. speaking, the quiddl ty or .. material thing cannot 
be the propett object ot the intellect, tor the a.lene8 of aol-
ence. 1. metaph,.s1cl and metaphyaics haa tor 1ts object being 
qua b.ing. Oonsequently, 1t the natural. object of the intelleot 
were the •••• n •• of a material thlng, the aolence of metaph,.sl •• 
would be impo •• lble.17 FttOm the theologioal viewpoInt the pro-
15 C.R,S. Barris, Duns Sootu., II, Oxt'ord. 1927, 24. 
P ¥$S3 
16 Suoh is the thesis of Fr. Seba.tian Dar,O.F.M., 
ln hIs Intuitive eO~itlon. St, Bonaventure, N.Y., 1947. Prot. 
Gl1son, 50V8ver, t. a6.0%ute1T oonvinced that Sootus never 
held this doctrine tor man 1n the pre.ent atate." Reportatic 
ot The Human Soul in scotus, Lecture Eleven. 
17 "Quldquld p'r s. cogno.cltur a potentia cognitive, 
vel elt ejul objectum pl'blum, vel cont1netur sub 1110 objecto, 
en. aut.mf· ut e8t comtl1UniUI .enaibill, per .e 1ntelllg1tv ab 
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per object cannot be the quiddity ot a mate~ial thing b.caus. 
the soul then could not natuX'&lly ••• God in the Beatitlc 
V1810n. Paychological grounds aJ.so rule this opin10n out, toX' 
the Intellect i. paX't ot the substance man, which i. an intel-
ligible univocally ca.parable witn the angelio Intelle.t. It 
both angels a~ men al'*e Intell.etual lubstances; then the,. muat 
both have the 8,ame proper objec t. 'lbe angela cannot have need 
ot obtaining knowledge trom the quiddities ot material things; 
therefore manta tntell.ct must know the qu14dity in 1t.elf 
wi thout knowing 1 t aa eXisting in the s1ngular .18 sootus t pttlnlt 
reason tor aa •• ,.tlng thla tact is that, aa he ae •• 1 t, ot~ra 
betore him have overlooked the tundamental pOint that the quId"", 
d1t7 or It.elf 18 .,ually inditterent to unlverlallty and sln-
gularity. What one l.e8 flrat 1n the existing thlng i, neither 
the universal nor the .ingular. It 1s the natura oqsnunis. nu. 
to the oommon nature, the cognition ot th. universal i8 posslble. 
tor It i8 not a property of the qulddit7 as Cluiddit7 that it 
exlst In the singular, or be known AI a unlver.al.19 
intellectu no.tro, allas Metaphyslca non e.,et .ag1a sclent1a 
transcendenll quam Ph,..loa, ergo non pote.t &liquid ea.e pr1mum 
objeotum intellectu8 nostri, quod alt partioularlua ente. quia 
tunc ens in •• nullo modo !ntelligeretur a nobia. tt ~ Oxon .. , 
I, d. 3, q. ) ••• " Vive. ed., IX, 6'-90. ----
18 "NUl seoundUll. auam ratlon •• , Angelus cum cagnosoat 
perreate quiddltate. rei material!s, oportet quod ips" aap10iat 
in phantaamate, quod .at lalaum." Opus 2xon., I, d. 3. q~ 6, 
n. 28, Vive. ed., IX, 292a. 
19 ftLioet ergo quldditaa non ex.iatat nisi in auppoaito 
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And '1et Sootu. holds that the singular is known di-
rectl,., bet'o1"e the unl"e •• al.19a He oorrectl,. .tate. that st. 
Thomas must :re11 on a .eturn at the ;l.ntelleut to the phantasm 
to know the singular, to. the matter whlch constitutes tne 
Thomistic prinelple 01' indlvlduatlon 1. necessarily oonfined 
to the aenae powe:ra and oannot 'enter the intellect. But Seotus 
object. to thl. explanation: "Haeo ~ •• 20nsl0 m1lla m- ,,20 
For the intellect .. t know either the singular or the universal 
fi1".t. It cannot know the singular first, linee. according to 
'lhomlstlc principles, the singular af,not the objeot ot direct 
intellectual oognit1on. !}hen the universal must be known tirst. 
"el singular!, pot.at 'baaen lnt.Illg! Ab lntellectu, non intel-
ligendo quod 8xeletat 1n eo, at al0 tal8WB e.t quod a.sumlt, 
acl11cet quod nOD poaalt lntellig! qulddltaa, nisi ut exeistena 
In singular1 intelllgatup. Non aDim e.t de ratione quIddltatls, 
ut qulddltaa .at, quod in slngul.arl exslstat, 11cet non nis1 in 
eo exalstat realiter." Ib14., 292a-b. 
19a Typical lp.a.agea are the.e. "Duplex .at cognlt!o, 
8cil1e8t abstl"'aetiva at intuit!v ..... et utnqu. cognition. 
poteat cognoael tam natura, ut praeeedit slngularltatem. qua. 
singulare, ut hoe." Ibid., III, a. 14. q. ,3, n. 4, Vives ed., 
XIV, ~24a. "Et lie comparando Int.ll.c~ ad imagination .. , 
a11quando oognoaoltur universal. pl"luII quam partioulare, et 
hoc est verum, d.um 1nt811.otu8 abatl'ahit uni"eraa.le a sens1b111 
apppehenso per sensum particularem.. Allquando priuS cognoscitur 
particulare: quod quid_ tit, dum abstrahitur ratiO univeraalia 
a phantasmate, •• u a re particular!, ut eat In !maginat1Ya. 
Comparando autem lntel1ectum ad .ensum perticularem, prior .st 
not1t1a singularis, et a •• nau, .t ab intellectu, quam notltla 
universalia, De Rerum prIqc12lo, q. 1), •• 3, Vives ed., IV. 
522b, -
292a. 
20 o,Eus, axon., I, d. 3 •• q. 6, n. 28, VIves ed., IX, 
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1 ty are not in the na tUN aa such- they a:re in the na tu:re. bu t 
not in the nature .a such--it is possible tor man to know the 
--
natures of thlngs without knowing the individuals lntultlvely.22 
Nor 1s It absurd to say that man haa the capaclty to intult the 
singular, but cannot do so in the present 11te. He still has 
the power; he is unable to exerolse it, just .. a blind ma 
still has the power of Sight, but cannot here and nov use it. 
There I~ br.ad linea 1. the outline ot scottatic 
realism. Tbe system pivots around the oentral ide.s ot the 
common nature and h •• coeity. The common natu!"e, which ex-
pressea the "rious qu1ddi tie. ot things, becomes universal when 
conceived by the mlnd in relation to interiors, and becomes 
Individual when individuated In one singular existing thing 
through the perteotion of haecoelty, which is not a torm, but 
the last ao wa1i ty ot the torm. Because individuation toUows 
upon something positive, the individual i8 given more emphasla 
b7 scotus than by most soholastics, indeed, many ot his tollowePi 
have wished to say that we do have real intuitive .-ledge ot 
the lingulaI'. But even PUl1ng thi. out, there remains a realism 
Which i8 suftioiently demarcated trom the reat ot the aoholastl0 
22 Scotua recognized this When he atated that the in-
divIdual goes beyond the e.sence ot the thing: "DettnitiQ ex-
prlmi t quid •• t causae epeoiel 801umJ aed indivlduum ex.pr1mi t 
plulquam qul~tatem. et Ideo .Jus non elt detln1tl0 propria." 
~.p. Par18., II, d. 2, q._ a, n. 10, Vives ed., XXIII, 4la.a. 
oe8 not say that we oannot know the aingular~ he :merelr 8 tate. 
that the knowledge had ot 1t cannot be uaed tor detinlt ons. 
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posltions to be characte~i8tic.ll7 the product of • dlstinct 
school. It 18 to thi. fa.et ot soholastic!a that Peirce WM 
attracted early in his lite. Following an exposition or the 
realism ot Abbot, the next ohapter will take up the influence 
these two men had on Peire. 1n the format ion or his realism. 
Francis Ell1ngwood Abbot (18)6-190) .a. from all 
account. a mistit, a man constantly looking tor a pOSition 1n 
lite that suited him and never tinding it. Moving in a reli-
gious and philosophical baokground, he wandered trom one pul-
pit to another in hi. search tor a religion which would leave 
htm tree acope to exercise his lIberal views. Hia philosophical 
acumen (dootorate from Harvard in 1881) was rir8t displayed in 
several artieles tor Tn. North American Review, and his Selen-
............ • $1*1 
tific Theia!!2'; won European acclaim, even being translated into 
Genman. He tatled 1n several attempts to obtain a ohair or 
phIlosophy at Cornell and Harvard, perhaps partiall,. due to 
theologioal reasona. He dId le cture tor Jos1ah 110yoe at sar-
vard one year, publi.h1ng h1s lecture. under the title ot The 
-
waz ~ .2! Asnoetlc1.m (1890). H1a last work was ~ 8111°61.-
~ Philoso2hI (1907), an elaborate technical ay.nth •• is of hI. 
thought which neyw.r became popular. 
2) Boston, leBS. All quotations in this theaia are 
trom the second edition, Boston, 1886. 
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TG. attention 81_en to Abbot in this theal. i. cen-
tered entirely on the Introduotion to hls ~oientitlc Thela.t a 
book whioh turned out to be more significant in the movement ot 
American philosophic re.11sm than in the cause ot tree religion. 
Ita exoellent exposition ot objective relatlvism 1s important 
here not only because 1t vas one of the flrst moves in that 
field, but also beeause it vas detinitely the touchstone whioh 
atarted Peirce's thoughts In the direction of vindioating the 
rea11sm of scienoe. One author has said that it vas "Abbot. s 
mistortune to be twenty years ahead ot his due time, It tor "his 
keen and subtle 01'1 tique ot idealism, so ottenslve to his Amer-
lcan contemporaries, would later have proved most aooeptable ... 24 
In th1. chapter the maln trends ot the ol'i tlque wl11 be made 
elear, and In the next It vl11 be shown that at least one Amer-
ican oontemporary vas not of tended by the reall.tl0 pOSition ot 
Abbot's Introduotion. 
After brletly stating the purpose ot his book, vhIch 
is that "tor a quarter of a centu17 It haa been rrJ'1 growing 
oonviction that the solution of all the problems can on11 be 
aocomp1iahed b7 the prinolple ot the ObJectIvItv ot Relations, .. ~ 
. _ ulllil_iiIiiIiIiiiilliilliiiiiiiiilliiiiiiJ 
Abbot launChes immediately into a polemic against the Copernlcan 
24 Francls Albert Christle, "Prancis Ellingwood 
Abbot," ~lctlonaEl ~ Americaq Blo~ra2hz, New York, 1943, I, 12. 
25 Scientitic Tbeism, ix. 
Nt 
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revolution ot Kant which he olalm. 1. nothIng more than the 
oulminatlon of the revolution begun b1 the nominalists c.n~lea 
betore, starting wIth Roaoelllnua and Oakham. Since genera and 
,pecie. are oleaaltieationa ot things based on thelr supposed 
resemblanoea and difterence., nominalism's denial ot all ObJec-
tive validity to genera and speci •• 1. the denial ot all obj.o~ 
tlve reallty to the supposed re.emblances and ditterenoe. ot 
things themselve., the denial ot all knowledge of the relationa 
ot objecta ls the denial ot all knowledge ot the objeota ~elat.dJ 
and thi. denial i. tantamount to the aasertlon that thinga-in-
themaelve. are utterly unknown. Kfm.tt. only contribution ~o 
this general schem., of nominalism waa that he expanded the 
unknowability ot the thing-in-itself Into a selt-conaistent 
phIlosophIcal Sf' tam. Sub.equent to Kantta masterly develop-
ment ot nominallsm. into a great phIlosophIcal edUice. all 
modern philosoph,., b7 taclt acreement, ".e.ts upon the nominal-
1.tlc theory of unlversals. 26 
In the train ot the ROlcelllno-tt-.tlan revolutIon 
the natural x-•• ult should have been the oontraotion ot human 
knowledge to mare selt-consciousness. Fortunately, however, 
there has alway. be.n a "oommon-sen •• " school 1n phllosophy 
and 1n the other tields Of lit. whlOb retu •• d to tollow nomi-
nallstio princIples out to thelr logical concluslons. These 
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school. have kept alive the realistIc side of that absolute 
and insoluble contradiotion between the one teaohing that 
cogni tion oontorms to things and the other that things con-
torm to cognltlon. 27 
So deep, in tact, iathi. contradIction rooted that 
the battle between nomlnalism and realls1l.u:\not over 7et. But, 
Abbot go.. on the sa1, just •• the realism of scholasticism 
perlShed before nom1nallsm, 80 wll1 nominalism in Its turn 
peri8h btttor. the new realiam of soience, the scientific reallsm 
or relationi_ to be explained 1n these page.. And *7 doea the 
ke7 to realism 11e in sclenc.' aecause sclenoe never gave in 
to nom.1nallam throughout the centul*les_ Abbot pointedl,. r .... 
marxsl 
It woUld be .uperfluous to cite further passases 
in order to illustrate the thoroughl1 objective spirit, 
method, andr.sulta of modern SCience, aa oontrasted 
with those of modern philosophy_ All scientific in-
vestigationa are tounded on a theorr dlamet2ioall7 
opposed to that of Kant: namel7, that thlngs can be 
known, though inc_ple te17 known, as they are in them-
selves, and that cogn1tion must oonform Itself to 
tham, not they to It •••• Science has achievee all 
its marvellous triumphs by practicall7 denying the 
fundamental principle laid down by Kant, and b7 
practically proceeding upon its exact opposlte, and 
1 t i8 a scandal t. philosopby that she haa not yet 
legitimated this practical procedure, ovePNhelmingly justifled .a it is by Its incontrovertlble results. 
Tbe tlme has come tor phllosophy to reverse the 
Rosceillno-Kantlan revolutlon, and give to science 
a theory of knowledge Which anall render the aclen-
titlc method, not praotically successful (tor that 
27 Ibid., 9-11. 
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It already Is), but theoretically 1mpregnable.28 
Abbot next ahOWI how Soorates, vltb hi. objective 
world, put r •• llsm into the tore tor a mlllenium and a halt, 
Influenclng both Plato and Arlatotle. However, the "terrible 
intolerance with which the Ch~h," which had taken it. stand 
in phllosophy upon Plato and Artstotle, natamped out all dla-
.ent trom this fixed .tand~ ot belief, inevitably tended to 
exclte a reaction against it, in p~portion to the mental actlv-
1 ty ot the age. ,,29 There should be, then, Abbot eont1nue., no 
cause to wonder at the tact that the cause ot nominalism came 
to be identitied with the cause ot intellectual and religious 
fr.edom, and the triumph ot the one with the triumph of the 
other. 
Porph7~t. Introduction to the Cate,orie. of Aristotle 
i8 now pointed to as the oeca.ion ot the great dispute between 
~om1nalls.m and real1sm, and Abbot proceeds to give .i2 theori •• 
!which at various times were introduced to solve the problem. 
Hi. anal,.si. is both enlightening in that it presents the vaPl. 
pus doctrines in very briet-although not alway. correct-torm, 
and helptul in that he ~apid11 seta the historical stage of the 
~ol. era. 
Extreme realism ( ..... uni .........v .... e_r .... 8 .... &_1 ... 1 .... a ante!!!!) taught that 
28 Ibid., 14. 
-
29 Ibid., 21. 
-
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unlversal. were substances or things, existing independently ot 
and separable troll. pal'tlculars 01" individuals. ThIs theol"7 was 
propounded by Plato and Seotus Erlgena. Moderate realism (un!-
-
vel'salla in re) also taught tinAt universals were substances, 
......... --......... ---
but only a. dependent upon and lnseparable trom indivlduals, 
In whlch the,. inhered; that is,·each univel'sal inhered In eaoh 
ot the partIculars l'anged under it. ThIs, Abbot atatea, wu 
the ~eorr of Aristotle. 
EXtreme nomlnallsm. (universali! 2o.t.!:.!!) taught that 
unlversal. had no substantIve 01" objective exlst.nce at all, but 
were merely empty name. or worda (nomina, voces, flatus vocla). 
... -. .. 
ibis was the doctrine ot Roaoellinus. Moderate nominallsm, 01' 
oonceptualism. (~lveraalia 20st r~~) taught that universal. 
had no substantive existence at all, but yet are more than mel'e 
name. signitying nothing) and that they exist reall,., though 
only subjectlvely, a. concepts 1n the m.ind, ot which name. are 
the vocal symbols. Ab.lard was probably tne orIginator of this 
system, and Ockham its chiet representative. 
A1bertus Magnus, St. Thomas, Duns ScotUB and the 
scholaatics in genel'al are put 1nto a 01ass by themselvea, which 
tUBed aIatbes. views 1nto one and taught that universals exist 
in a thl" .... told m.anner, .!!l1!!!!!, .!!! re, and post .!:!!!.30 
None ot these vieva aatisfled Abbot. He therefore 
.. 
proposed • sixth which would 801ve the question ot realism and 
nominalism decialvely_ His theory ot relationiam, or acient1tic 
realism, (ot which universali. _i_n_t_er~, !!! may be adopted aa an 
apt tormula) teachea that universala, or genera and apecies, are, 
first, objective relations ot resemblance among objectively 
existing things, seoondly, subjeotive concepts ot these relations 
determined in the mind by the relations themselvesJ and, thirdly, 
names representative both ot the relations and the concepta, and 
applicable alike to both. This doctrine, "although empirically 
employed with dazzling success in the 1nvestisation ot Nature, 
does not appear to have been ever theoretically generalized or 
atated. ,,)1 
What is the roundation or relationism? The dootrine 
in general rests for its Justification upon the broader prin-
ciple ot the objectivi~ ot relations. In particular, the 
propositions on which ~lationism depends are these. 1) Rela-
tions are absolutely inseparable trom their terms. 2) The 
relations of things are absolutely Insepa~able t~om the things 
them.elves. ) The relations ot things must exist where the 
things themselves are, Whether objectively in the wo~ld or sub-
Jectively in the mind. 4) There is no logical 8.1 ternative be-
tween affirming the objectivity ot relations in and with that ot 
things, and denying the objectivity of things in and with that 
11 Ibid •• 2";.26. 
ot relatlona .... 32 
The tremendous atep torwa:rd made by this theory over 
scholaatic real 18m i8 that it avolda the great error ot the 
sehoolmen, the hypo8tatlzation ot universala aa substances, 
entitles, or things, relationism teaohe. that genera and apeel •• 
ex18t objectlvely, but only a. r.elations, and that things and 
:relatloDs oonstitute two great, distinot orders ot objeotive 
reali t,., inseparable in existence, yet d.lstinguiahable in 
thought. lbe philosophic value, laatl,., ot this new doctrine oan 
hardl,. be overt.t1mat.d. It aav.a .at is good 1n each ot the 
other proposed solutions to the controvera,. over univeraals, and 
rejects what 1. bad. It vindicate. extreme rea11s. tor upholding 
the objeotivity of universala, 'but ahows that it waa Wl'ong in 
classing the. as independent and .eparable sub.tancea. It Jus. 
tlties moderate realiam tor maintaining the objectivity ot uni-
versals, but ohastises it tor making them inherent in individuals 
as individuals, rather than in groups ot individuals aa groups, 
tor relationa do not inhere in either of the related term. taken 
Singly. but inhere in all the terma taken colleotively. Rela-
tioniam praiae. extreme nominali •• tor 1t. denial ot universals 
a. 8ubstances or things and tor its affIrmation ot the exi8tence 
of univeraala aa name., although it vas wrong in asserting that 
univeraal. did not exiat obJeotively .a relationa and subjectivel, 
32 Ibid., 26-27. 
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as concepts. Moderate nominalism, al. though admitting univeraal • 
• 
subjectively aa concepta, still retained the error ot denying 
their objectivity as relation •• 
It relationism is the great panacea, how has it been 
allowed to remain hidden all these years? The presupposition 
ot thi~ question must be distinguished. As a doctrine, rela-
tionism has been obscured by nominalism Which gradually won the 
ascendancy among philosophers atter the downfall ot scholastic 
realism. As an untormulated and empirical prinCiple, however, 
relationlsm did eXist, and became the actual practice of scien-
titic observers, experimenters, and inve.tigators of nature, 
although they may have been nQminallsts in name.)3 But why 
did the philosophers not discover this theory at some pOint in 
their speculations through these centuries, espeoially it it ia 
so evident a solution to the problem of universals? Undoubtedly 
this vould have been the case, had philoaophl continued to con-
centrate its attention on the problem ot universals. But once 
she had accepted nominalism, which said that universals do not 
exist,she vaa confronted with a new problem. For the schol-
astics, the source ot knowledge was placed in the universals. 
with no universals, how was the origin ot oognition to be ex-
plained? Nominalism turned ita tull powers to the solution ot 
this question, and allowed the other problem to slip trom its 
33 Ibid •• 29. 
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Even here science had the answer, While phIlosophers 
were dividing into two camps on the origin of knowledge, while 
Descartes and the a priori school thought cognition begaa in 
the mind, and Locke and the a posteriori taction voted for the 
senses, while alath!s useless bickering vas going on among the 
philosophers, science boldly adopted the principle ot objective 
verification to uphold the origin of knowledge, a prinCiple 
depending absolutel,. for Its validit,. upon relationism. Ever 
since then "SCientific men have quietl,. assumed the objecti1ity 
ot relations and steadily pursued. the path of disoover,. in total 
disregard of the disputes ot metaph1siClans.ft~ 
Science, therefore, in d.eed rather than in word, is 
challenging the very toundation ot nominalistic philosophy. She 
denie. by the erection of a vast and towering editlce ot verified 
objective knowledge that genera and species are devold of objec-
tlve reality, or that general terms are without their objective 
correlates. Her very existence is the abundant vindication of 
relationism as the atable and solid foundation ot real knowledge 
ot an objective universe. In tact, aa the ca.e now stand., 
philosophy has two great schools, equall,. founded 
on a reasoned subjectivism which denie. the fO.Sibi-
liil at knOWiSf' 1n any degree, an o6leclIVe ,. exI.t-
en cosmos as t really ia; While science rests immov-
ably on the tact that ahe actuallz knows such a eoa-
34. Ibid., 33. 
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,110a, and prov •• ~ v ... 1tl"atlon the realit,. of that 
knovledaa whiCh jEl!oaoph,f tou!l,. and emphatioall,. 
denle •• ;)!> 
What mu.t philosoph,. 40 to keep up wlth thechanglng 
t1me.' She must .hake ott the blighting lntluenoe of .chol ••• 
tlciam, for .he has never modernised heraelt suftIo1ently to 
get rid ot noainalla., one of the legitimate ottsprlng ot the 
Middle Age.. To 40 thia ahe will have to ".It mod.atly at the 
t •• t ot .ci~oe"'6 and 1mbue her.elt thorougn11 wltn the 'Plr!t 
ot the .clentltic method. on1,. then vill ahe be able to .olve 
the problema she hal be.n .tPUggllng with .0 long. Arlstotle, 
acoording to Abbot. had seen the 'Glution a long t1me ago, it 
interpreted oorreotl,.. 
Translating the 1104.I'&te Realism ot Al'iatotle 
into the more accurate lansuaae of Relationi •• , and 
not forgetting to eoneot ita oaplial enor ot making 
the unive .. aal. inhere in eaoh i.ndividual a. an 1ndi-
vidual (in re) rather than in all the 1ndiyldual. 
as a groUP ~t.r HI), the meaning of hi. dootrine 
18 that soleno. I.-OOneerned with the 8.,.1'&1 •• la-
tlona of tbings rather than wi th the thinss th ..... 
•• lv .... w1th general laws rather than with thl-pecu. 
li.~itle. or acoident. or lndlyldual obJ.ot •• ~T 
~u. things would become subordinated to tne general law8 WhiCh 
govern them, a directIon whlCh plainly i. oppoalte to that 
taken br 50otua. 
35 Ibld., 3.3. 
-
.36 Ibid., 41. 
-
37 Ibid., 41-42. 
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In aumma17 ot Abbott a 8"lt_ a .hor.er .tatement oan 
hat'dly be tound than that he himselt propo •••• 
ObJectivi •• in .cience take. its etand, oon-
sciously or unconsolously. on Relationt... It, 
tundamental prinoiple 18 the law ot Objective Veri-
tioa t1on-tIlat 008111 tlon DlUstc,ontoN i t.elt to 
thing., not thing. to cognition. ~e neoesaar:r 
corollary ot th1. 1a. 1. the tn.eE~abi11tl ot nou-
.ena and eh.no.ena, phenom'81'la lieing Se 'app'iir'Ei •• t 
01 no;Mina. ana n&w..na beiDl that wh14h ·app.ars' 
and 1. partlal17 understood 1n p~e~.na, and iher 
have th.lr 1i.'ls.p .... bl. exietence, not onl" in the 
mind, but also in the oosmOI whioh the mind cog-
ni..... 'lhe only utilit" 1n retaining the distino-
tion at, .. &11 i. to mark the dlstlnctlon between com-
plete and 1noomplete lmov1ed,e-noumena being taken 
to denote thlng.-in-them.elvee a. tne,. .xlat in &11 
the oomplex1 tr ot tbei:r obj.ctlve att:r1butea and 
:relatlona, andphenODlena being taken to denote tbe.e 
.ame thinge-ln-them.e1v •• 80 tar only a. they are. 
known 1n tneir obJectlve attribute. and relationa. 
tn. linal outcome ot Icientlfl0 objectivlsm 18 a 
constantl,. Srov1ng knowledge ot the real. CO.moa as 
1 t 1$; 1.u whloh the human mind haa '" ts proper PlaCta 
and actlvl t7 1n entire harmoDJ' wi th comical 1a"s.'" 
Havll3g propo.ed the theories of the two men by whom 
Pelrce wu moat influenoed in hi. realism, it 1. llOW the oppor-
tune moment to examlne ,.lrc.'1 u •• of the •• aourc •• , and to ••• 
how elementa ot sootUI and Abbot found thelr way Into Pelroe-. 
philosoph,.. 
CHAPUR IV 
PEIRCE'S USE or SOUROD 
The work. of Dun. SootU$ have 8 tronsl,. 1ntluenoecl 
me. It hl. 10g10 and •• taph,..lcI, not alav1sh1,. wor-
shipped, but torn ava,. tram 1 ts medievalism, 1)e adapted 
to .od.rn cuI ture, under oontinual r_inder. ot nom1nal-
lstlc oritic11.I, I .. convlnced that It will go tar 
toward .uppl,.lng the phl10.~ which ls b •• t to hu-
mont •• wl~ phr.leal Iclence. , 
Thi. is onl,. one atatement or Petree t • Wblch att •• ta hi. inolina-
tion to accept ~he teaohing ot Duna scotua ae .. baala tor his 
own realism. It thl. were the onl,. reterence to SCOtU8t ,elrce.a 
alleglance to b1Dl mlght be qu •• tloned. But the 1'1._ ot scotU$ 
appears so tre(luentl,. 11'1 the vltlnga ot P.1rce that it 1s pla1n 
that he breathed the •• r,. atmosphere of Sootl .. in hl" ~h110ao­
ph,.. pelroe, .however, must not be construed ae adopting 8cotu. 
in the context of the Middle Age., tor, al though.hehad "bMn an 
attentlve and med1tat1ve .tudentff2 or the works of Dun. t he "4 .. 
not .ean that he Is g01ng baok to the genepal vleva of 600 year. 
baok, he .erel,. .eana that the pOint ot .etaph,..loa upon Wbleh 
scotu. ohletly lnstated and which haa 81n •• pa ••• d ~ut ot .ind, 
1 CP, 1.6. 
-
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ia a varr imPortant pOint."l Hia pr.ia. or the SubtlAl Doctor 
Is, nevertheless, almost w1thout bounds, tor Peirce considers 
him as the one representative of scholasticism 1n whom he was 
personally interested. In Pe1rce's estimation, "the metaphysic. 
of Aquinas, a modlfied Aristote11an1sm, had b.en immensely 
e1abo:rated and d •• ply transformed by the vast logic-a1 genius 
ot the Briti.h Duns scotuSt"4 who was "one ot the greateat 
metaphysicians ot all ttme."$ In 1893 Pei:roe oould write. 
flyet be it known that never. during the thirty years 1n which 
I have been writing on philosophical questions, have I tailed 
in my allegianoe to realistic opInions and to oerta1n Scotistic 
ideas_"6 Whethe:r th1s strict adherence to Soot1.tic teaching 
continued through the rea t ot hi. lite is an interesting point 
that will ba commented on presently. 
In traCing the elements ot Scott. tIc realism which 
",are the occasion ot s1milar doctrines in Peirce, there 18 no 
way in Which it 18 pos8ible to ba absolutely certain that Pelroe 
de~lved any specltlctheory trom hi. study ot one particula~ 
philosopher. Allthat can be done is to indicate certain log!-
c",paralle1., and draw the interenoe that Pel~oe had conceived, 
3 g. 4.$0. 
4 CP, 2.166. 
-
5 OF, 
-
4.28. 
6 CP. 6.605. 
or at l .... t worked out, the ide .. under the intluence of his 
reading 1n the history ot philosophy_ 
What are the teature. or 3cotiam, then, that attracted 
?eirce? It must be remembered that scotus was not the only 
scholastic with Whom Peiroe was acquainted, tor he va. tamiliar 
w~th st. frhoMAs and others or tbe Middle Ages. but never went 
out of his way::o honor them with the meed of praise. T.hererore, 
elements must be singled out which are characteristically sco-
tl.tic, and which the other systems as a general rule are lack-
1ng. 
Scotu.' most distinctlve realistic teaching centera 
around the common nature and the haecc.ity, .s has been shown in 
the last chapter. Peirce aaw in these two idea.s many thinga 
which appealed to him, and aome ot the conclusions he reached 
reflected this knowledge. First ot all it will profit to look 
at Peirce's dootrine on universals, or rather, generals, tor he 
rarely used the other ter.m. 7 Then some reatures ot haGceeiv" 
which interested him can be delved into. 
Peirce. from his study ot science in tneory and prac-
tice, bad learned to reject nominalism 1n tavorot reallsm. 
But he did not wish to make theoapi til mlstake of going too 
7 Feibleman gives this rea.on: uPeirce preferred to 
call his universals generals in order to ahow that he d.1d not 
mean them to be anything absolute 01" final, an advance over 
Kant .s well as over Abbot." Introduction to Peirce)s Phl1o-
so~~:r. SO. • -
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far in the other directIon, and ending up with an extreme real-
ism which 'tIOUld be only another torm of nominali am. Therefore 
he wanted to assert that his general. were real, but yet not 
the "really real," to borrow the Platonic phrase. He round a 
means to IncorpoJliate the.e tacts in his realism th:rough Scotus t 
teaching on the oommon nature, which is the intelligible con-
tent ot the universal, pr8.cindlng from .i ther singular or un!-
vere .. l existenoe. This common nature does not merely exiat 
in partioular things, as the Aristotelians say, nor is it sub-
siatent in it.elt as Plato wished. Rather, it haa ita ovn sub-
jective unity, being neither a pur. intellectual fiction, nor 
exi.ting Objectively in the world of nature as an individual. 
Thi. objective unity ot the ComDton nature, 1II.lich nevertheless 
is leas than numerical uni ty, mak.. it an integral part ot the 
real world. Thus Peiroe va8 able to affirm. that his generals 
had some reality, and he.till managed to avoid PlatoniC reali.lIl, 
a charge that Feibleman vished to lay at hi. doorstep a8 was 
•• en above. 
'!hu. tar Peirce may .eem to be in broad agreement with 
eoholastic realism, at l ... t .a proposed by Duns scotus. But 
there is this important ditterenoe in his way ot considering 
the general Which must be taken into account. For Scotus, •• 
tor all the scholasticl, the thought required to apprehend the 
univeraal i. that or the indlvldu.lntellect, and thi. appre. 
hension 1. the result ot the nec •• sary )mowledge ot being. 
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Peirce changes this picture oonsiderably, tor the thought Whioh 
grasps the reality ot the general is that ot the community ot 
minds employing the method ot scientIfIc Inquirr throughout an 
unlimited perIod of time. S Theretore anyone individual's appre. 
hen.ion of a general is not necessary, but probabl_ only, and 
stand. to be conec ted by what succeeding minds w1l11.00.e to 
know of the same general. 
It is when Pe1rce talks of elements derived trom haec-
eeity, though, that his dependence upon Sootus becomes quite 
marked. Aristotle and st. Thomas Aquinas, making the principle 
of individuation unknowable matter whioh give. the individual 
its numerical unity, lett the somewhat anomalous aituation of 
the individual being constItuted through something which eould 
not ot it •• lf be known. This view ot Aristotle and the schol-
astica vas predominant during the early Middle Ag.s, leaving the 
indi't'idual a ,omeWhat vague ent! ty" in WhIch the universal form 
was the thing that was accentuated. peiree did not lIke to 
8 se., tor example, OP, 5.311: nThe real, then, Is 
that Which, sooner or later, lrilOP.mation and reasoning would 
final17 re,u1t tn, and which is therefore independent ot the 
vagaries of me and you. Thua, the very origin ot the concep-
tion ot l'ea1it7 shows that this conception e.o.nti&11,. involves 
the notion ot a COMMUNl'l'Y, w1 thout dat1ni te 11m! ta, and capable 
ot a definite increase ot knowledge. n 
See also CP, 2.654n. Where he aa.,.8' "I do not here 
admit an absolutely Unknowable. Evidence Gould ,how us what 
would probably be the ca .. after an,. given l.pse ot time, and 
though' a subsequent time mIght be as.igned which that evidence 
might not cover, yet further evidence would cover it." 
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have the l"eal1 ty ot the individual thus subordinated to the 
reali ty ot the universal, and in Scotus he tound a way 1n which 
the realism of actual pal"ticulal"s could be made equal to that 
ot generals without losing at the same time the generality of 
his realism. Thus Scotua' teaching according to which the in-
dividual i8 constituted by a positive entity in its individuality 
allowed Peirce to restore the emphasis on the reality ot the 
individual without giving up the reality ot generals. 
But haecce1tJ has tal" more implioat1ons in Peirce •• 
philosophy than the one already de.cribed. A passage combining 
the neeesa1t.y ot something to make the general idea particular-
ized in each subject, together wlta a rejection ot an over-
zealous adoption of extl"eme realism, is the following: 
An indexical. word, web. .. a propel" noun or 
demonstrative or .elective pronoun, haa .toree to 
draw the attention ot the listener to some heoceity 
common to the experience ot speaker and listener. 
B.1 a hecce1ty, I mean, some el .. ent ot existence 
Which, not merely by the 11kene.s between its dlf-
terent apparltiona, but by an inward torce ot Iden-
tity, manitesting it.elt in the continuity of its 
apparition throughout time and in space, is distinct 
trom eve 17 thing e18e, and 1s thus tit (a. it can in 
no other way be) to ~ec.lve a proper name or to be 
indicated .s th.Is or that. Contrast this with the 
slgnitication-or-the verS, which is sometimes in 
rq thought, sometimes in yours, and which has no 
other identity than the agreement between it •• everal 
manitestations. That is what we oall an abstraction 
or idea. 'Ibe nominalists 8a7 it i. a mere name. 
strike out the f.ere t and this opinion 1. approxl-
mate17 'Wue. The realist. say :1 t is real. Sub-
stitute tor '1s,- ma~., that is,-r. pro.ided ex-
perience and reason .;Il, aa their-rlnal upshot, 
uphold the truth of the particular predioate, and 
the natural existence ot the law it expressea, and 
... 
thi. 1. likewise true, It 18 certalnl7 a great 
mi.take to look upon an 1dea, merelt becau.e it haa not the mode ~ existence ot a eocelt7. as 
a 11tel... thing. 
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In the oateg0!7 ot Seoondn ••• are round the greateat resem-
blances to haeccelty, top Se.oDdness i. tact, aa haa been shown, 
and tact 1a aomething "pertectly indivIdual. It happens here 
and now. ,,10 
Again Pe1roe declarea. 
In truth, any tact is 1n one .en •• ultimate-that la 
to say, in 1ta lsolated aggre •• ive stubbornne.s and 
ind1vIdual realIty. What ScotU8 calls the haecc.ltie. 
ot thlngs, the hereneas and nowne.a ot, them, are in-
d •• d ul t1u te. 'Why this whioh la here i. luch a. 1\ 
ia, how, tor instance, it it happens to be a grain 
ot .and, it oame to be 80 amall and 80 hard, 'We can 
askJ we can a180 ask how 1t got carrIed here, but 
the explanatIon 1n this ea .. merely carri •• us back 
to the tact that 1t waa once 1n 80me other pla.e, 
where s1ml1alt thingl m1ght naturall,. be expeoted 
to be. 'Why I7'. independentl,. ot 1ts general chaNO-
ter., com.s to have &D7 definite place in the world, 
is not a ClHstlon to be asked, 1 t 1s Ilmpll an ul ti. 
mate tact. 
Poundationa to~ Peirce'. doctrine ot chance are also 
round in thi. t.aohing ot seotua. Every explanation. tor in-
stanoe, or the moon'lI path, a phenomenon tha t _1 aeem to l'.st 
indubitably upon universal, intlexible prInCiples, must take 
particular existenoe. and events into con.ideration betore the 
9 ep. ).460. 
-
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general law can be to~ulated. Such original or underlved In-
diTiduallt,y and d1.er81t7 18 preoisell what Petree means b1 
Ohance,12 and trom this point ot view ohance, springing trom 
the individuality ot each partioular event, 1s prior to law, 
as was explained at the end ot chapter two. 
In the ph.ses ot Peirpe' a realism Just outlined it i. 
possIble to traoe definite pOints ot oommunity with Scotistic 
metaphysics. But an underl.,ing c~nt ot dIsagreement is a180 
present, Whi~ WOUld indicate 01 ther that Petrce dId not under-
stand Scotu. tully, or that he broke away trom h1m unCI.". aome 
other Intluenoe. T.bIa latter h1PO~e8is .eems to be the better 
ot the two, especlall., when account 1s taken ot the taet that 
Peirce i8 18.8 magnanimous in his praise ot Seotus during the 
year8 following 1900. In 190) he writ.s that he calls h1mselt 
"an Aristotelian ot the scholastic wing, approachIng Sootlsm, 
but gOing much further in the diHctlon ot scholastic realism, ,,13 
&s though he disapproved ot Duns tor not teaching the tullnes. 
at scholastic rea11.m. The same rear he states: ffNop in other 
re.pects must it be suppo.ed that r .... nt to everythIng either 
in ScOtu8 or 1n Kant. We all commit our blundera. H14 By 190$ 
his criticism 18 more pOinted, tor he had came to suspect Scotus 
12 el, 6.612. 
-
13 CP, $.71n. 
-
14 CP, 6.9$. 
-
~ 
ot Inourrlng the one oharge that alva.,. mad. 'elrce ••• red, 
"1 ultimately oame to approve ot the opInions ot nuns, although 
I think he inoline. too muob toward. nominalism •• 1S In 1909 h. 
openly dltfer. tPOll Sootua In interpreting haeceei ty to contON 
wi 1m hi. pragmatici .. , but he tri •• to sa7 that hla mean1ng Is 
what Scows "., r8a11., driving at. 
It [the correlate ot a relation] is existent, in that 
1 ts' being doea not oonal.t In any iuilltIe., but in 
Ita ettect.--ln Ita aotuall., acting and being acted 
on, 80 long a. tbi. actIon and sutterlng endures. 
Thoae Mba experience It. etteota pero.ive and know 
It In ~t aotlon, and just that constItute. Its very 
being. It Is not in perceiving it. qualitle. that 
the., know it, but in hetting It. 1n.latency tben and 
there, whIch nun. oalled Ita haecceltaa--Dr, It he 
dldn·t, it waa thIs he waa groping afier.1b 
'elrce evidentl., wa. attempting to mold Sootl.m to tIt 
the reall.tlc philosophy whIch he thought was nec •• aary to uphold 
the reall8m ot .cienoe. HIs reason tor borrowing tram both 
Sootus and Abbot Is well .%pHased by Felbleman, "'!'hi. demand 
[tor a philosophy ot solence] Peirce tound adequately supplied 
by the realIstic philosophy of Duns Sootua. From Abbot's work 
Peirce had learned that .clenee vas realistic ~ather than no.m1-
~all.tloJ but, aa Peirce himselt saId, it was Dun. scotus who 
~ad ahowed him exaotly Mbat kind of realism was conformable 
1S £!, 1.560. 
16 g, 6.318. 
11 Introduction!! 'eiroe'a Philoaoehz. S1. 
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~itn scienc.: MI7 AbbOt's contribution to the formation of 
pelrce's realism, then, was tne clear to~ul.tlon ot the real-
Istic Vinclpl •• on whioh science rested,IS and its need tor a 
realistic philosophy to glve tormal:8upport to the 1nv •• tigationa 
it had been carrying on independently of philosophy_ 'Ibis much 
Peirce took trOll Abbot. but the. elaboration WElS hi. Q1ftl, tor 
he va. the tirst modern philosophical advooate or the realistio 
character of aci.nce po •••• sing autticlent technlcal knowledge 
to be able to de.rend the posltion. l ' 
Peirce'. theory of Thlrdnesa, or law, has definite 
ele .. nts of Abbott .. 8clentlfl0 reall_ In 1 t. For 8cience 
starta with Inductlons to erect hypothe.e., which are then tes-
ted by observations, and; 1t round valid, uaed .. s a baala tor 
deductions. Thus the existence ot universal princlples or laws 
18 required., laws. moreover, which are independent of an,. person 
or collection ot peraona having knowledge ot' th_-a oapital 
pOint In Peirce t s theory. 1hese laws, to go .. step turther, 
ape not absolute, are not mere aummarles ot known tacta, but 
alao are tinder. of new ones. 1hus sclence has come to be tOl" 
18 CP, 4.1. "Dr. Abbot 1n bla Soientific f,ne1s. hal 
'0 olearl,. andwlth auch admi:rable simpl!cl!y Shown tliaf modern 
science 1. realistic that It le perhaps Injudicious tor me to 
attempt to add an,.th1ng upon the subject. M 
SO'. 
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peiroce not only a study or tacta 1n and tor their own sake, but 
alao a search tor the lawa demanded bY' the taots and inclusive 
of them. 2O RaHin can be seen a rea.on tor the Ihitt rrom 
striot scholasticism to a mod1tied to~ ot it Which include. 
the relationi.a outlined by Abbot. For it tact. ~. not ~o be 
the prime lntere.t, then Peirce would not be conoerned so much 
about a static un1vepsal Which existed in each particular thing 
.a he would be 1n oonnecting th ••• things together to arrive at 
a general law which would govern tbe relations of thaM to one 
another, op, in other words, 1n arriving at the universal rela-
tiona between things. Peirce attributes the advances made in 
modern science. over those made In ancIent precl.elj" to the 
tact that an increased knowledge of the relations of things 
haa been acquired: 
The words • cause' and teffect' atill linger, but the 
old conoeptions have been dropped trom meohanical 
phl1oaoph,., tor the fact now known is that in cer-
tain relative positions bodieaundergo certa1n .cc.l .... 
erationa. Now an acceleration. instead of being like 
.. veloclt,. a rel.tiont between two 8ucceuive poslti(l1s, 
i8 a relat10n;' between tbre., so that the new doctrine 
has conaiated 1n the suitable introduction ot the oon-
20 OP, 1.1. nTh •• , in brlef, mJ phl10sophy mal" be 
described a. ~ attempt of a physiCist to make such conjectures 
aa to the conati tution of the univerae as the method. ot science 
may permit, with the aid of all that has been don. by previous 
philosophers. I ahall supp"rt my propos! tlons by suoh argument. 
as I can. nemonst:rative proot i. not to be thought ot. '!he de-
monst:ratlons at the metaphysicians are all moonShine. f-ne best 
that can be done is to suppl,. a h1P0th.Si8, not devoid or all 
likelihood, in the general line of g:rowth of scientifio Ideaa, 
and capable at being verified or reluted by future observers." 
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ception ot th~een.a.. On tnis idea, tne whole ot 
modern phy.lcs 1s buIlt. The superiorIty- ot modern 
geometrJ, too, haa certaInly- been due to nothing 80 
much as the brIdging ot the innumerable dl. tIne tea ••• 
wi th which enolent science vu enoumb.~.dJ and we lD&J 
go so tar as to sa,. that all the g~eat stepa In the 
method ot scienoe In .very department have con.isted 
in bringing into relatIon eaae. p~evlouel7 discrete. 21 
In brief f'01"111, than. "Iarioue phase. ot Peirce'lS realism 
which aeem to have been occasioned by elementa d~wn trom $cotus 
and Abbot he •• been enumerated. The Ide. of the general as 
being something Hal In the vOl"ld, wIthout having the ultimate 
l"eallt.ywhlch belongs only to indIviduals 18 well taken care ot 
by Sootu. t common nature and haeccel ty. Th1s]A at factor, more-
ove~, i8 carried out 1n 'elrce-a continual insistence on the 
absolute imperativeness ot the oat0801'1 ot Secondne •• , and in 
his principle ot chance which demands that the indiv1dual 
even ta be all oonsidered betore the un1 "eraal law 18 tONU.-
lated.22 From Abbot ,eiree learne" that scienee depends upon 
the.e general'ftlat1ona, tor the conception of dlatinct things 
not standing in relation to one another 1a a.na.l.aa, and would 
lead ul timatel,. to ao11palam. But Peirce advance. on the .. ide.a.. 
and states that the cognitIon ot universals cannot be nece.8&r1, 
since they arEt continually being further determ1ned and deve-
22 Which even then remalns only a general law admit-
ting of development, and Is not strictly- universal. 
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loped. But this is a wrinkle Peiroe himself worked out. not 
to be attributed to either Scotus or Abbot, and it will be lett 
tor the last chapter in Which a judgment will be paased on the 
realism ot Peirce, both in relation to th ••• sources, and in 
itaelt. 
OHAPTER' 
EVALUATIO. OF PEIRCEt! SOHOLASTIC REALISM 
NOW tnat Peirce'. doctrine on rea118m haa been ex-
plained with reference to its aource. in scotua and Abbot, 1t 
18 t1me to pas. 3ud~.nt and to evaluate hi. 87stem ot rea11 •• 
in the 11ght of scholaatic principle., to whioh he a1. way. 
olaimed faithful adheren.e. This taak is not an easy one, tor 
Pelrce la not lacking in Go.curl tr f even on poln t8 about which 
he apeak. frequently_ 
Peirce can hardl,. b. said to have begun a complete 
revolution by hi. teaching on realism. NO man haa ever b.en 
independent ot hi. predecessors in evolving a dootrine, and 
Peirce, powerful and original thinker though he vaa, resembled 
other great men in that he belong. to a detinite tradit1on. 
Reid and Hamilton had declared for reallsm in Gr •• t Britain 
the century betore, and Peirce vas well aware of their work. 
Beaide., aa haa been a.en, he re11ed on the r.aliat1c doctrine 
of the acholastics to a verr high degree. Theretore he dId 
not excogitate hi. realism una1ded by the philosophy ot the 
past. Hi. glory, rather, liea 1n thiS, that he argued strongly 
tor a realiatic philosophy at a time when America was reeling 
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very much the intluence ot the nineteenth century idea11at10 
and subJectivistio phl1osophies ot Hegel, per8onallam, evolu-
tionism, and absolute ideali8m. To Peirce, and to Abbot, goes 
the honor ot s •• lng that seience would contradlct Itself once 
It had denied the obJectlvity ot relations. ne aaw that the 
ant1quatlon ot Arlstotle'a physios was no reason for throwing 
away the tlne bedrock ot reality, loglc, and metaphysics v.h!oh 
are actually the bases tOI' any ph,.sics whatever-" And s.eing 
that, he strove hi. utmost to bring these realistlc principles 
back into philosophioal reapectabili ty atter tour centur-!e. ot 
diarepute. That he dld not succeed in hls day wal due to un-
tortunate circumstance. ot obscur-ity and lack ot influence 
beyond his control, that his realist1c principle. and logic 
are having Influence today upon philosophers ot aU sohool. 
ls supreme evidence ot thelr intrinsic wor~, and a t •• ttmo.n7 
that Pelrce was a generation ahead ot h1s time in his phllo-
80phlcal tendenoie •• 
Peirce, theretore, advocated a realistic phllosoph7 
far ahead ot his contemporarIes, the question that this the.i. 
wlshe. to an.wer, however, 18 precise17 what kind ot rea11sm 
Pelrca had. It has been shown In ohapter two that he dld have 
a true realism, and not me:-ely a phenomenal IdealIsm, 1Ihlch 
contuaes the real thing. wl th the men tal appearance. ot them 
when the,. are known. But Pelroe ola1.m.ed 1IOpe than a mere pas.inc 
grade in the subJeot ot ;peall., he claimed to have gone back to 
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the scholastics, to Duns Scotua in partioular, and to have 
evolved a scholastic reall.m that would tit modern soienoe. 
Is this last claim ot his Justified, and it not. why not? 
1nis, as 1s evident. Is the nub of this the.l., and to avo1d 
the quest10n would be to leave the work undone. 
That Peiroe dld have'm&qy atr1nitie. to .chola.ticlam 
.s proposed by Scotus ia plain from the last ohap tel' and n.ed 
not be proved agaln. But, a. hinted at previously, there are 
also pl'otound ditterences. There are three prinoipal oount. 
on whioh Peiroe-" interpretation ot the generaldif.rel'. tl'OlI. 
the soholaatics' universal, and on each ot these it will be .een 
that the d1tterence. are tundamental and irreooncilable. 
The scholastics, and scotus was no .~oeption in thia, 
held that the basis tor the universal was to be tound in the 
substantial form or ••• enee ot the thing, thus malting the uni-
veraal depend on something intrins1c to the being, indeed on the 
thing most intrinsic to it, ita quIddity_ Thia point 18 funda-
mental to soholasticism a180, fo~ a man 1s not called a man be-
.aus. he act. in a certain way, but merit. the p~.dicate becaus. 
he has a certain nature, whether he placea any acts or not. 1he 
.econd point of tn. scholastic theory trom which Peirce d1ffers 
1. that the operations flow trom a being _.oauae a being i. 
determined by its torm to act 1n such and such a way, and there. 
tore the regularity, acoording to the achola.ties, MUst be sought 
In the torm, and not merely in the eft.fta O~ hab1t of o~eration 
103 
a. ,uGh. Lastly, the lohoolmen held that the universal was 
apprehended by the lndividual intellect and gave a n .. es8&17 
knowledge ot being. 
Measuring Petree'. general agalnat the.e oriteria, 
.&veral ditterences emerge immediatel,.. FIrat of all. the 
fundamentu.!el! tor hi. general i. not the qulddItJ ot a 
thing, buS rather the way tbe thing operate.,l or 1ta habit 
ot action, something which 1. partially determined, but which 
wIll .tl11 admit ot further determination .s 1t develop.. Peiroe 
had no other choice, tor with hi. prinCiple of chanee he could 
hardly .ettle upon fQmetnlng tlx.d aa tne foundation tor hi. 
general and at the aame tlme retain an explanation tor the ohange 
and development In things. With the operation of a th1ng tor 
the baaia tor the general, however, he eould allow tor tn. chance 
happening whIch would be the beginning ot a new habit, and thu. 
ot a new general a8 the thing, accord1ng to 1tl ne. habit, was 
now related to other thing. in a new vay. 
Secondly. Peirce, inatead ot s.eking a natu~~ ~ieh 
would be the principle ot operationa under investigation, wa. 
rather inclined to place the total reality ot the general 1n 
the operation it •• lt and it. relation to otiber things. But aa 
1 S.e CP, 1.210: "~e predicate, hardn ••• , i. not 
invented b7 .en, 'ii the word i8, but 18 really ana truly in the 
hard things and is one 1n them all, aa a de.cription ot habit, 
disposition, or behavior." Note eapecially the last phrase. 
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long a8 Peirce retused to look into the principle of the ope~a­
tIon, scholastics would say that he dId not have an adequate 
explanation for the phenOlllena, and therefore did not have aut-
fieient foundatIon tor his systam. As was shown 1n ohapter two, 
th.~ i. a dispute Whether Peirce held that there i. a Bubstanc. 
underlying accidents Or not. It may be that he di.regarded or 
overlooked the question ot substance, satisfied with the atrir-
mation that the accidents were real, but this could hardly atto~d 
an ultimate explanation ot the accidents, and it is thl.s that 
philosophy Should give. 
As tor the 1.st tactor, Peirce denied that the uni-
versal 1s apprehended by the individual intellect and resulted 
in nec •• s&1"'1 knowledge, but maintained instead that the general 
i8 grasped by the community of minds employing the method ot 
acient!tic inquiry throughout an unlimited period ot time. The 
scholastics. nece.s.17 knowledge of the unohanging universal 
baa yIelded the tield to mere probable knowledge ot • general 
Which i8 continually becoming more and more pertect. 
Having shown that the interpretation given by Peirce 
on th ••• three questions 1. Qthe!" than that ot the scholastlca, 
the question might arise whether these elements are essential 
to Peirce f • S7.t8ml or afle accidental and could be abandoned 
w.J.tbout harming his realism .a luch. A ahort revie" ot SOme 
ot the prinoiple. on whlch Peirce baled his phIlosoph,. might 
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vas by evolution, especially Lamarckian evolution whioh is based 
on the evolving of habits through chance occurrenoes, Peirce 
placed much weight on the principles ot continuity and chance. 
The one holda tor a continual progress in nature from the lowest 
up to the higheat, trom matter to mind. The principle ot chanoe 
(tor through chanoe oocurrences.new habits aris.) gives a sut-
flcient rea. on tor the regularlt,. tound in nature. tor onoe a 
thlng haa happened 1n one way rather than In another, a habit 
18 set up according to which .. ctions in the fuwre are llkel,. 
to take place. 
From this br1er aummary of 80me of the underlying 
pre.upposltlons that Pelrce took tor granted, It ls eas1 to aee 
that the theory of the general .a presented above i8 essent1al 
to hi. .7stam, tor he oannot poaslbly have a tixed foundation 
tor hi. general as long as he holds a principle of chance de-
manding the opportunlty for some po.sible future variation. 
1he same criticism would hold againat hi. negleot to evolve a 
doctrine on substance, tor an evolutioniatie philosophy, while 
not nece.aarily denying t1xed natures of things, f1nda the path 
much smoother it th1s q.ueation can be ignox-ed. Aa for only 
probable lmOldedge ot the general in Peirce'a theo17, this nee •• -
.arl1,. tollow. from the tact that at anJ particular moment the 
general is not yet tully evolved, and therefore could not result 
in a neoessary knowledge ot being tor the individual intellect. 
Only at 80me tu ture time,. when the .volu tlon will have been com-
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pleted, can the communltr of mind. hope to know general •• 
But, if Pel~cets universal Is not one common nature 
whlch can be predioated of man., indivlduals slngly and univoc-
ally, does he .,.et reta1n a realism' n:. argue. vehementl,. that 
he doe8, and his argument seems to have genuine worth. He take. 
the operatlon ot a natural lav,- the law of gravitation, to exem-
pllfy his th.ory_ Prom o .... rwh.lmlng experienoe In the past that 
unaupport.d atone. tall fr •• ly,. _n necessarily ltuppo ....... ven 
more, he knovs-that th18 atone, 1f pelea.ed, will tall. Nov 
this knowledge can oome trom two h1Pothe.... Either the uni-
tormity with which tho.e stones have tallen In the past haa 
been due to mere chance, and .riord. no ground whatever tor 
thinking that this .tone vll1 tall, or the ~itorm1 ty v1 th which 
the .ton.s have fallen haa been due to some active principle 
1fhIch i ... general, in Which ca.e It would be a .trange coln-
cldence that it .hould oe •• e to act at the mament mr pr.diotion 
was based on it. 2 Peiroe oontinue •• 
ot cour.e, eve1")" sane man vill adopt the latter 
hypothesis. It he could doubt It in the caae ot the 
atone--~1oh he can't-.and I maya. well drop tb. 
atone Onee tor all--1 told you sol--!t anybody doubt. 
thl. still, a thousand otber suoh induotive prediction. 
are getting .er1tled everr dar, and he will have to 
suppo.. eye17 one ot them to be merely tortul tous in 
order reasonably to eaoape the conolua1on that 
\in.Pal y 1nCil'le. are reall, ~erativ. In nature. 
at fa 58 aoc£rrn. of scno aa Io rEtaIiii.' 
I • r 
2 st, S.100. 
3 CP, 5.101. 
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Theretol'$. al thOUgh the general 18:ltOt the nece.,uil,. 
known tor.m Which the leholaaticl conceived, it neverthele •• 1. 
rooted in real 1 t'1 and haa real meaning. It 1s a saneral law 
or mode of aoting to whlch thing. contorm. It 1., to put it 1n 
Abbott. worda, an obJeotive relation ~loh holda good between 
th1ng. and on whloh our knowledge ot them 1. ba.ed. 
Here, then, i. a vide end fundamental divergence trom 
the acholaaticla ot Scows. was Peirce aware ot this dlttep-
enc.' It aeems that he va., tor .a haa b.en noted In the 1.at 
ohapter, after he explained haeeeeit,. to conform with hl. prag-
matic norm, he .tate. that thi. i. what Scotus meant, it he did 
not actuall,. mean it. An even DlOre convincing proot that Peirce 
aaw dltterence' between hi. doctrine and Scotta Is the tollW1ng 
pa.sage, which also shows that 'elroe recognized Abbot as the 
aoure. trom whioh the divergence at ... ed. 
But What diatingulp.e. 1 t [pragmatici .. ) trom other 
.pecie. 1., first, lts retention ot a puritled philo-
sophy •• econdly, It. full •• ceptanee of the main bOdy 
ot our inatinctive belleta, and thirdly, its strenuous 
inaistence upen the truth of a.holastic I'eallam (01' a 
cloae approxtmatlon to that, well-stated b,. the late 
Dr. Franeis Ellingwood Abbot in the IntJlOduction W 
his Seient1tio Th.i ... )~ 
Again Peirce aaY8. "I am mY8elt a .eholas tio I'ealist ot a 
--.~ewhat e~tl'~e 8tr128."; With this evidence it i8 plain that 
4 CP, 5.423-
-
5 CP, 5.470. Italics not in the original. 
-
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peirce had not tooled hlmaelt 1nto thInking that his reall .. 
was exactl,. the same as scotus'. pe:rhaps the reason wh7 he 
conttnued to lay cla1m to a soholastio peal ism at all waa tn.t 
he conoeived himself a. "taking the point ot .etaphysics upon 
which scotua &:h1e.tly tnalated,- without ttgoing back to the 
general view. ot 600 yeara b&ck. n6 B7 so doing, he would not 
be "slavishly 'Wor8hlpp1ng" the logic and metaphyslcs ot D\UUl 
sootus, but would bave "adapted it to mode:rn oulture. fl7 What ... 
ever the anawer--whetber Peirce thought that hi. modificationa 
pt Scotiaa still allowed him to remaIn wi thIn the pal. ot 
acholastic thought or not--lt seem8 certain tnat he in tact 
proposed a s7stam oontrarr to 8ebolaatlc princlples on univep. 
aallty and general1t7. tor 1n denying the scholastic notion ot 
subetanoe and 4ulddlty as the ba81a tor hi. ganeral, he 1 .... 
voeahly .eparated h1maelt trom true scholastio realiam. 
One last consideration yet remains tor surveillance. 
Doe. Peiroe f • theory of un1versals, sinoe not exaotly identioal 
wltb soholastic moderate reali.m, verge more towards .xtreme 
reallam or toward. nominal!.' In other word., are PeIrce's 
generale more real or le.s real than the sCholastice' un1wer-
eate' 
The universal nature tor the soholastic Is derived 
109 
.. 
from the form, tn. act, ot the being, and of itself denotes 
only pertectlon. It must, ot course, be r ••• lved into matter 
to exist and to be indlviduated,S but the matter glv •• only 
the individuality of the being, and in no way contributes to 
causing the being to have thi. or that form. 
Peirce, worklng wIth an evolutionisti. world which 
i. continually progressIng from the somewhat impertect atate 
at tn.e beginning to Its full actualisation, had a dIfferent 
view. In the primItive chaotio state of the world the forms 
were all immer.ed in the amoI'ph.oua maa. ot _tter which conati-
tuted the origin of thing.. '.!b..n, a. t1me went on, the forms 
began to evolve them •• l ..... from the matter ~ough the principle. 
ot chance and continuity, r.aehing atter higher and higher mod •• 
ot perteetion. At some period in the indet1n1tely tar tu~re, 
a poInt which the oommunity ot mInds will 1me,.." but which no 
indIvidual here and nOW can know, the •• torm. will have fullJ' 
evolved, and wl11 be tully actuali •• d. But until noh time tha,. 
ere ,. till in the proce.. ot formalIzation, ao to apeak, and &a 
-
.!!!!! are baaed nct on.l7 on aot but al.o have potentiality in-
trinaecall,. connected with them. a potentlallt,v whleh vl11 be 
fulfilled ~en the form 1. tull,. actualized. 
8 At le.at aeco~d1ng to the ~oml.tic doctrine. But 
even tor Scotus the common nature i. the torm, or Itrietlr In the 
line ot act, to WbI~h haecoeit,. com ••• a the la.t actualitT 
betore the indivldual is constItuted in being. In neither s,..-
t •• do the note. ot the unival-•• l contaIn poten.tlal.lty. 
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It would theretore seem that pel:rce aocords le •• 
realIty to the univ.rsal t~an ~e scholastlcs, tor inasmuch 
as he allows the unlversal to embraee potentiality, he place. 
In it an element ot unlmowabillty. And.a an :idea can repl'esEJnt 
the real only ina.much .e it Is knowable, the un! versal of the 
scholastics 1. better su:ited to portraying objective reallty 
than the g.neral ot peirce, aince everything in the universal 
i. knowable, While aomething in the general must nece.aarily 
remain unknowable. 
'!h.se, then, must be the final judgments ot Peirce' I 
theory ot Haliam. Although he doe. pos.eas a tl"'Ue :reallsm, 
and thus serv.. as • butter against the nominalism and idealism 
ot the many philosophers who preceded him trom the ttme ot De.-
c8l'tes, he certainly do.s not pos.... the schol •• tic realism to 
which he laid cla1m. The principal reason tor the ditterence 
was the laboratory-trained mind ot peirce .. who, al though genu-
tnely trying to establish 8. metaphysics, was prevented by hi. 
ove~ram1l1a~it7 with the methods of solence trom accompliah1ns 
this t.sk. Hi. soientlfic .ense ot arrlving at an exact goal 
only at some date tar in the tutuH obtuscated for him the truth 
that the mind has here and now the intuItIonal power ot under-
standing certain th1ngs elearl.,. Hia roundations in evolution-
iltic theoX7 and 1n the principles ot chance and continuity 
rendered his general incapable ot be1ng known by the individual 
intellect. :the general, being bound up with an .:Ie ment of 
Ul 
potentia11 t1~ 1s theretore le.8 xaeal than the universal of the 
sOholastica, although it Itlll 1. real, tor it represents 
- , 
general principles which are reall7 operative in nature. In 
denying Peirce the title of scholastIc realilt one must not 
den,. him hIs greatest achievement. that of having atta1ned to 
801118 sort of reall_ in ttl. mldat ot the subJectlylat1c philo-
aophlcal surroundings in 'Wh1ch he 11 ved and worked. 
... 
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